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Now that there are no more than a
small handful of socialist countries
left, it has become a particularly
interesting question from an ethno-
graphical point of view, what is hap-
pening in these countries. What
were the Cubans doing for instance,
when their beloved Máximo Líder
was suffering from a serious illness
and was said to have only days to
live? They were watching Doctor
House. 
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1 . I N T R O
Together with a wide American,
Hungarian and other international
audience the majority of Cubans
worry week after week, how the cyn-
ical, mysanthrope, non-existing doc-
tor manages to cure a peculiar ill-
ness of a non-existing patient.
According to the Cuban correspon-
dent of the German Süddeutsche
Zeitung, the series has swept empty
the streets of the little island nation,
meaning that a great number of
Cubans watch the series made by
their mortal enemy. And as ever so
often it occurs, reality and fiction
are interwoven. One episode of the
series is about a Cuban couple who,
although loyal subjects to Castro,
are fleeing the country on a boat to
see the brilliant TV doctor with the
wife’s odd disease. 
How did they know on this secluded
island that there exists an expert of
tropical diseases in Princeton, New
Jersey? 
They must have watched TV. It can
be by all means assumed, however,
that the creators of the show were
largely inspired by the Cuban suc-
cess, to invent such an unusual
story line. (It will be interesting to
see how the Cuban censorship will
react to the refugees.) 
5
E
ve
ry
da
y 
G
lo
ba
li
sa
ti
on
 
1
. 
IN
T
R
O
D
U
C
T
IO
N
D U C T I O N
Dr House is only one of the many
anecdotes symbolizing globalisation.
Until recently it had been the privi-
lege of a select few scientists and
journalists to experience the pres-
ence of globalisation. It was them
who could travel and see how much
the different parts of the world
intertwined. Globalisation started to
accelerate 20-30 years ago but was
still not conspicuous in everyday life
and its analysis had remained a sci-
entific issue. Today, there are hardly
any parts of the world that have
remain untouched by globalisation
and most people recognise its extent
in their own life. 
Only a few disagree that globalisa-
tion is a defining process of the 
present age. All political movements
are forced to self prescribe a particu-
lar identity. This phenomenon,
which was hardly spoken about two
or three decades ago, has an ever
growing dominance both in social
sciences and in political journalism.
Unlike many sudden populist
trends, it is not a passing fad. 
The concept of globalisation 
becomes increasingly diffuse because
it is said to be linked with nearly
every possible development. The
phenomenon, however, is real.
Largely due to globalisation and 
its related processes, the world is
radically changing.
Globalisation is an unbelievably
complex concept that cannot be
restricted to a couple of internation-
al phenomena. It is necessary to
avoid seeing it as a solely economic
process as is so fashionable today. 
In addition to the obvious economic
and commercial dimensions, globali-
sation expands over our social and
cultural relations having both major
and minor influences on them. In
our definition globalisation is the
integration on various levels of the
international economic, social, politi-
cal and cultural processes.
Globalisation is therefore not a sin-
gle, clearly defined process but the
combination of several, partly con-
nected, and partly separated
processes. Globalisation is charac-
terized by the progression of “deter-
ritorializing”, i.e. the loss of the tra-
ditional role of territories. It entails
a reconfiguration of geography, so
that social space is no longer wholly
6
mapped in terms of territorial
places, territorial distances and ter-
ritorial borders. Anthony Giddens
has thus defined globalisation as
“the intensification of world-wide
social relations which link distant
localities in such a way that local
happenings are shaped by events
occurring many miles away and vice
versa” (Giddens 1990: 64). David
Held et al (1999: 16) defines globali-
sation as a “process (or set of
processes) which embodies a trans-
formation in the spatial organisation
of social relations and transactions -
assessed in terms of their extensity,
intensity, velocity and impact - gen-
erating transcontinental or inter-
regional flows and networks of activ-
ity” (Smith, 2002).
As any big change, globalisation fills
people with great fear. Ever since
the industrial revolution the world
has undergone more rapid changes
than in the previous millenniums.
Scientific inventions together with
significant social-cultural innova-
tions drove us at high speed towards
modernisation. As if the speed of
accelerated, radical change was
frightening in the past, becoming
identifiable and analysable after
only a generation, now they mani-
fest within one or two decades. They
transform society, economy, culture
and not least environment on an
everyday basis. It is no wonder that
mankind, who has never faced such
rapid changes before, is now hugely
taken aback. “The world in which
we find ourselves today doesn’t look
or feel much like they predicted it
would. Rather than being more and
more under our control, it seems out
of our control – a runaway world.
Moreover, some of the influences
that were supposed to make life
more certain and predictable for us,
often have quite the opposite effect
(Giddens, 1999: 2). 
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1 What is interesting to see is that Italy and Germany should find globalisation a positive process, the two countries who
have suffered from the greatest economic problems in recent years, partly because of failing to prepare for the effects
of globalisation. On the other hand, the relatively successful United Kingdom has the most negative opinion. The actu-
al data (positive/negative, the rest is not sure): United Kingdom: 15:53, USA: 17:45; Germany: 36:42; France: 18:53;
Italy: 25:55; Spain: 17:54.
As a result, it is predictable that the
press would be, softly speaking,
mixed about globalisation. In wider
public opinion its reputation is even
worse: overwhelmingly negative. As
an example, according to a Financial
Times/Harris Poll in July 2007, in
the six western economic powers
(USA, United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Italy and Spain) only a
minority finds globalisation a posi-
tive process (Financial
Times–Harris Interactive, 2007)1. 
A significant proportion of
Europeans see economic danger, cul-
tural uniformisation, social alien-
ation and diminishing social solidar-
ity behind globalisation. The fight
against them is one of the most
important political activating forces
world-wide. The extreme right and
the extreme left alike take to the
barricades over globalisation. Both
the youth and the older generations
find it threatening. Even among the
politically moderate it is more com-
mon to view the process with con-
cern than with optimism. 
As any complex process including
several different factors, globalisa-
tion too has numerous negative
effects and affects many people’s life
adversely. Experts agree, as an
example, that it undermines the
chances of under-skilled workers in
developed countries because the 
low-paid, industrial and similar jobs
they typically do are done for less
money in the developing countries
(Garrett, 2004). On the other hand,
as the effect of the same process,
hundreds of millions of people have
escaped extreme poverty and contin-
ue towards middle class and better
living standards in the developing
world. Today social mobility is being
realised for hundreds of millions in
India and China, the two largest
countries, and the poorest in the
world. 
It is difficult to strike a balance with
globalisation and we would like to
emphasise that it is not an aim of
the present study. However, to paint
a complete picture, it is necessary to
look at all the aspects of the phe-
8
nomenon. In the Hungarian public
discourse positive features of globali-
sation are hardly mentioned, nor are
the numerous new and hitherto
unseen opportunities which could
have been created by globalisation
alone. There are two attitudes
towards the spread of globalisation
among those who we call pro-global-
ists for the sake of terminological
simplicity. Tony Blair expressed one
of them as follows: “Complaining
about globalisation is as pointless as
trying to turn back the tide. There
are, I notice, no such debates in
China. They are not worrying about
potential threats but are busy seiz-
ing the opportunities in ways that
are transforming their society and
ours as well” (Blair, 2006).
The second attitude is our, slightly
different, opinion. We believe that it
is indeed essential to have a sub-
stantive debate on globalisation. 
A key element, however, is to recog-
nise the above considered opportuni-
ties and include them in the debate.
Focusing on the negative points only
makes the debate biased. Politics,
provided it reflects the social dis-
course and public opinion, will be
biased too and therefore it will draw
false conclusions. We believe that
globalisation is, if not entirely con-
trollable, still a shapeable process.
As Tony Blair briefly put it: globali-
sation has to be adapted to. Those
who keep pessimistically wondering
about the development will fall
behind. On the other hand, it is also
true that globalisation requires 
complex approach. The dual require-
ment is, all the while, to recognise
the problems it causes as well as the
opportunities it entails. 
A significant majority of analyses on
globalisation focus on macroeconom-
ic processes, complemented with the
fact, where appropriate, that politi-
cal institutions become intensely
internationalized. As the above
examples show, globalisation is not
a process happening on an abstract
level that can only be illustrated
with statistics. On the contrary,
globalisation radically transforms
our everyday life. Our “lifeworld” is
being rearranged as a result of
changing ordinary, everyday
processes. The concept of lifeworld 9
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has been transported from philoso-
phy by Alfred Schütz. His main idea
is the critical approach towards the
traditional methodology of social sci-
ences (Schütz, 2003). According to
Schütz “the positivist rationality of
social sciences can describe certain
structural elements of society but it
is not capable of understanding the
core of society, i.e. everyday life”
(Szombati, 2003). According to
Schütz becoming familiar with
everyday life and thinking – i.e. the
lifeworld – is more important than
the traditional macro-theories of sci-
ences, farfetched from real life.
Schütz has “created the research
framework of the newborn social sci-
ences: the world of everyday life.”
This is the very idea that motivates
our present study: globalisation
often manifests in a way that we are
unaware of, a novel development/
phenomenon is becoming a part of
our life that has so far been present
only in the outer world, and often in
the distant and exotic world.
Globalisation manifests itself in
many areas of our everyday life.
Just think of the Chinese restaurant
where we take away our dinner, the
Argentine music we listen to, the
American blog we read, the Korean
film we watch, or the French and
English supermarkets where we like
to shop. These are changes that are
hardly visible in the natural course
of everyday life, unlike, for instance,
the giant investments of the Korean
tyre manufacturer, Hankook or any
events in global politics.
Nevertheless, their impact is deeper.
Our life is not happening in the
Management Board of Hankook or
the UN Security Council but in the
experiences of everyday life. This
does not suggest by any means, how-
ever, that international economy
and politics are not important. On
the contrary, we deal with them too
little rather than too much. But the
everyday effects of global processes
are hardly discussed and even if
they are, the disagreeable subject of
cultural homogenization often stig-
matizes discourse.
10
Public discourse is hardly about the
fact that the transformation hall-
marked by globalisation opens
numerous doors in our everyday life,
in the fields of culture and in the
way we define identity. Cultural
globalisation does not mean cultural
imperialism lead by dominant
groups but it means a mass of net-
works operated by individuals and
communities of individuals. The
peculiarity of cultural globalisation
is that it is not a top-down process,
planned from above and forced upon
people, but significantly the result of
a bottom-up initiation, started and
organised on the level of individuals.
Manuel Castells says that in infor-
mation society, one of the most
important fields of cultural globali-
sation, there are nodes in the global
information network, but there is no
centre (Castells: 2005). The initial
predominant role of the USA is
decreasing on the global level,
despite the absolute expansion of its
networks. Everywhere on the globe,
both horizontally organised net-
works and the information nodes
promoting national languages are
strengthening considerably.
Together with numerous other
effects of globalisation, they are
transforming our everyday life per-
manently and providing new dimen-
sions through which to define our
identity. 
A basic suggestion of the present
study is that Hungary must con-
sciously prepare for globalisation. On
the one hand this means that in the
above mentioned macro-areas, the
fields of economic competitiveness
and foreign affairs, the government
and the state has to establish poli-
cies on the basis of relevant strategic
priorities which would relatively
improve Hungary’s situation. On the
other hand, preparing also means
that in the everyday dimensions of
globalisation individuals have to pos-
sess a similarly conscious attitude
towards the transforming lifeworld.
In modern society individuals cannot
be exempt from the responsibility to
confront the changing world openly
and to evaluate and grasp the oppor-
tunities it offers. In Anthony
11
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Giddens’s words, we have to learn to
orientate in a “runaway world”
(Giddens, 1999). This entails greater
risk and more individual responsibil-
ity, but in return it opens up numer-
ous useful opportunities. Preparing
for globalisation is indeed the task of
the society as a whole and aside from
the essential role of politics and civil
societies, it starts first and foremost
with individuals. 
The present study of DEMOS
Hungary Foundation intends to fill
in a gap in the public discourse on
globalisation. To undertake such a
role, we consider two main compo-
nents. Primarily, the present study
scrutinises the everyday, cultural
and social aspects of globalisation,
not using the generally dominant
economic-commercial approach as a
starting point. Secondly, we focus on
the advantages and opportunities of
globalisation, especially when it is
the responsibility of individuals to
seize them, and when the state can-
not play more than an auxiliary
role, due to its limited abilities.
Within the framework of the present
project, from the various dimensions
of globalisation we concentrate pri-
marily on the aspects of mobility,
both in the geographical sense of the
word and with respect to the inter-
national intellectual and cultural
processes. 
Globalisation is undoubtedly one of
the most commonplace terms in
Hungary today. Those willing to
participate in the discourse on glob-
alisation have to be prepared to con-
front demagogy, violent emotions,
massive ignorance and commonplace
arguments. We are ready to face the
possible nuisances of such a demo-
cratic dialogue, since in the long run
it is always better to foster than to
avoid debate. Furthermore, in order
to realise an effective debate we find
it important that the targeted topics
of our study be clearly outlined.
Therefore, we continue by defining
the scope of the present study.
The aim of the next chapter is to
give a general picture of globalisa-
12
tion and its literature. It examines
the ways in which contemporary
global processes are novel and what
phenomena have come to determine
the globalisation of today. Then,
Chapter 3 review intellectual and
geographical mobility as global
processes. We present the concept of
the terms and analyse the tenden-
cies characterising them worldwide.
At the same time, relying on statis-
tical indicators where appropriate,
we touch upon the situation of
Hungary analysing in which fields
we are lagging behind and where
our situation is already favourable.
Finally, the summary focuses on the
fields where there is still room for
improvement, and where our atti-
tudes prevent us from consciously
forming the process of globalisation
and exploiting the opportunities
effectively. We conclude by making
suggestions as to what ways citi-
zens, intellectuals and politics can
contribute and help us form an
active, not uncritical but still open
attitude towards globalisation.
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2. Globalisa-
tion in the
modern
age
-
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In-depth studies on globalisation
divide the analysts of globalisation
into two groups: hyperglobalists and
sceptics (Giddens, 1999; Held et al.,
1999). According to the first group
the world will become entirely glob-
al, the nation state and national cul-
tures will slowly or even rapidly dis-
appear, their role being taken over
by the global cosmopolitan culture
and/or government. According to
sceptics the concept and process of
globalisation is overvalued by the
public discourse and the analysts.
Both the nation state and the
national cultures stand in the centre
of major social processes and will
continue to be their predominant
determinants well into the future.
Nations will join the global process-
es as much as they please, and
shape “globalisation” consciously, in
line with their own interest.
Globalisation extends as far as
nations allow it. Importantly, each
move towards globalisation is rela-
tively easy to undo. It is notable to
mention, the group of sceptics often
declare that, essentially, the world
is not more globalised than it used
to be at the end of the 19th, begin-
ning of the 20th century when the
proportion of world trade to GDP
was similar as it is today (to be dis-
cussed later). Note that the above
standpoints do not suggest categori-
cal opposition or support of globali-
sation. Both groups have members
who would be happy to see a dynam-
ic globalisation of the world and
members who would have negative
attitudes towards it. 
Having thus defined two extreme
standpoints, analysts of globalisa-
tion take a comfortable seat in the
moderate centre. They claim that
the world is globalising but not to
such an extent that nations should
disappear or cultural uniformity
should manifest, as feared by many.
In the present discourse we feel
comfortable in the centre, too2.16
2. GLOBALISATION 
IN THE MODERN AGE
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Globalisation is an existing 
phenomenon which is, in its 
present form, qualitatively different
from any previous globalising
process. At the same time, nation
states play an important role in the
shaping of globalisation, by means
of, just to mention one example,
determining the regulatory system
of international trade. This combi-
nation – globalisation being an
existing but influenceable process –
further emphasises the necessity of
determining our attitude towards 
globalisation consciously. 
It must be clearly decided in what
direction we want to affect the 
phenomenon and what role we
assign to ourselves in the global-
ising world. Those countries that
have successfully adapted to 
globalisation in terms of economy
(e.g. the USA, UK, Ireland, South
Korea, Singapore and Australia)
and those who are successful in the 
global field both economically and
socially (e.g. the Scandinavian 
countries) have all determined their
politics consciously and consider
globalisation as a strategic ques-
tion. 
To avoid globalisation being solely
an external compulsion it is neces-
sary to evaluate its meaning and
determine how we want to benefit
from it. It is not our intention to
present our point of view on the
process of globalisation and its
moral questions. Instead, as high-
lighted above, our focus is the so far
unknown opportunities globalisa-
tion entails, and how we can join
the global processes on a day-to-day
basis in order to benefit from them.
We do not mean to dwell upon eco-
nomic and commercial viewpoints
primarily. The present study
intends to touch upon fields of
everyday life such as culture, 
travel, education and the Internet.
Thus, we wish to demonstrate that
the concept and process of globali-
sation encompasses fields where its
presence has not yet become obvi-
ous. Before discussing these points,
we briefly reflect on a significant
polemics in connection with globali-
sation, whether it is indeed a new
phenomenon or an old process
returning and continuing by new
means. 
2 It has to be added here that the division into hyperglobalists and sceptics is an over generalized notion, because in
reality only few analysts of globalisation adopt any of the two extreme standpoints. The spectrum between the two
extremities is broad and the overwhelming majority of scientists and analysts is located somewhere on this spectrum.
Besides globalisation as a positive process it also holds for its normative and value judgements.
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Is globalisation a new phe-
nomenon? 
Fewer and fewer deny the novelty of
the modern mechanism of globalisa-
tion compared to the globalisation
processes of previous periods.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to
recall these arguments and explain
the fallacy of that approach. In fact,
people have always tried to main-
tain contact with their close and dis-
tant neighbours by means of trade,
for example. If the difficulties of liv-
ing made it necessary, they moved
from their birth place, temporarily
or permanently. Different centres of
knowledge have always attracted
people longing to learn, ever since
antiquity. People interested in sci-
ences have often risen above the
limitations of local life. Empires and
great religious systems played an
important role in the birth of reli-
gious, moral, legal or cultural com-
munities linking distant communi-
ties thousands of years ago. The
Roman Empire which was forged by
military force was a giant, partially
integrated community and spread
over wide regions. Christianity could
also spread relying upon the frame-
work of this empire and might be
considered the first real global
movement. The global ambition of
Christianity was closely trailed by
the Islamic desire to expand.
Besides the well-known Silk Road
linking the Mediterranean and Asia
there were several other trading
routes dating from antiquity and the
Middle Ages. The analysis of this
ancient interconnectedness, e.g. the
expansion of empires and world reli-
gions, discoveries, colonisations and
trading networks has helped Held
and his colleagues identify several
periods of globalisation in their book
Global Transformations, one of the
most comprehensive works on glob-
alisation. The period they call con-
temporary is simply the newest –
although also according to the
authors it is radically different than
all the previous ones. (Held et al,
1999).
Those who deny the special charac-
ter of the contemporary globalisa-
tion, like to refer to the “modern
period”, named so by Held and col-
leagues. According to some, it start-
ed around 1850, to others, in 1871
with the end of the wars unifying
Germany and the beginning of a
long peaceful period in Europe and
ended with the two World Wars. The
acclaimed British historian, Niall
Ferguson says the following about
this period: “The last age of globali-
sation resembled the current one in
numerous ways. It was character-
ized by relatively free trade, limited
restrictions on migration, and hard-
ly any regulation of capital flow.
Inflation was low. A wave of techno-
logical innovation was revolutioniz-
ing the communications and energy
sectors; the world first discovered
the joys of the telephone, the radio,
the internal combustion engine, and
paved roads. The U.S. economy was
the biggest in the world, and the
development of its massive internal
market had become the principal
source of business innovation. China
was opening up, raising all kinds of
expectations in the West, and Russia
was growing rapidly” (Ferguson,
2005). Similarities are indeed
numerous and it can be also added
that at that time American immi-
gration was practically unlimited.
Today the USA, formerly the biggest
host country, similarly to several
other countries introduced more
restrictive immigration policies
(Negus-Velázquez, 2000). Therefore
in the field of migration – in a sim-
plistic interpretation – the degree of
globalisation has relatively
decreased. 
As is evident from this rough
overview, the historical processes of
globalisation share a number of fea-
tures that characterise globalisation
today. Nevertheless, differences are
fundamental. For one thing, in sev-
eral dimensions new globalising
channels have opened up which
have not operated before. Secondly,
we can affirm that the new range of
instruments of globalisation resulted
in a significant quantitative growth
compared to the previous forms of
globalisation and as in many other
fields, after a while, larger quanti-
ties have brought about changes and
developments which implied qualita-
tive differences as well.
The proportion of world trade to
GDP in itself does not seem to be
determining. However, if we peep in
an average household in Budapest
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today, we face such material globali-
sation that would astonish anyone
who lived at the beginning of the
previous century. Although the label
“made in” was not in fashion at that
time, if we compared the number of
goods and verify how many of them
have come from abroad in an aver-
age household now and then, it
would turn out that statistics on
trade before 1914 are quite deceiv-
ing. Today we encouter many more
foreign goods, products and services
on an everyday basis.
What’s more, markets became
indeed global. Thanks to the modern
communication technologies and
especially to the World Wide Web as
such, international financial mar-
kets operate 24 hours a day, terri-
torial limits have ceased to exist and
participation is no longer localised.
During the night one can take part
in a financial transaction on the
other side of the world and from any
point of the world it is possible to
move capital between any other two
points of the world. Markets, just as
the world in general, are radically
transformed as the relevance of dis-
tances disappears. “Due to the new
information technologies, geographi-
cal distances and the time needed to
bridge distances shrink. This phe-
nomenon is called space-time com-
pression by David Harvey. In 1872,
the hero of Jules Verne’s novel,
Phileas Fogg could have wagered
with mad audacity only that he cir-
cumnavigates the world in 80 days.
Today, it is possible within a single
day on board of a passenger air-
plane. The possibilities of marketing
on a foreign stock exchange, booking
airplane tickets on-line, or sending
e-mails all seem to justify the theory
of ‘space-time compression’ ”
(Dessewffy, 2004: 24-25). The peculi-
arity of the present economic
processes and at the same time one
of the main signs of globalisation is
that capital moves not only from the
West to the East and South but in
the reverse directions as well. After
the extensive buying-in of Japan in
the 80s, now it is the companies of
India and China, members of the
developing countries, who have
started buying up the West. For
example, the Chinese Lenovo took
over the production of laptops from
IBM, and the Indian Tata Steel
bought one of the biggest European
steelmaker companies, the English-
Dutch Corus Group.
20
However, it is also misleading if we
compare the present and the previ-
ous periods of globalisation based
solely on trade or economic data. A
fundamental difference is that glob-
alisation today influences numerous
other fields of our everyday life. Let
us consider the most obvious ones
first. International organisations
establish institutional framework for
the relationships between countries.
The international legislation system
endeavours, however weakly, to map
the regulation of national legal sys-
tems on a global level. The UN is
clearly not a global government but
it is indisputably, despite all of its
shortcomings, a much more effective
coordinator of international cases
than its predecessor, the League of
Nations. International courts, espe-
cially the new-founded International
Criminal Court (ICC) deal with
international litigation more system-
atically than ever before. As far as
ICC is concerned, it even interferes
with the local law enforcement’s sov-
ereignty of the countries in question.
Both the European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights strengthen
international law enforcement. The
international institutions increas-
ingly regulate the cooperation and
relationship between countries,
although for the time being, this
process is extensive in few fields
only, e.g. in trade and human rights.
At the same time, international law
is becoming increasingly intricate.
Due to the further development of
free trade, global regulation in some
fields, for example environmental
protection, energy and transport can
reach a similarly detailed level as
national regulations. This would not
mean the birth of a global state,
which we are far from experiencing.
Nevertheless, although any violation
of international law receives wider
attention than conforming to the
rules, the latter is, in general, much
more typical for the international
community. When Iran ignores the
UN SC resolutions or the USA the
decisions of the WTO in a trade
debate, these incidents, due to media
attention, make the impression that
international law is feeble. On the
contrary, in reality “nations follow
ninety-nine percent of international
law ninety-nine percent of the time”
as a researcher of international rela-
tions put it polemically. According to
many authors, international law
provides firm standards (Price-
Tannenwald, 1996; Wendt, 1992).
21
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Institutions built on regional cooper-
ation like the European Union, the
Mercosur in South America and the
Asean in Asia play a significant role
in representing international law.
Such institutions are simultaneously
responses to globalisation and its
guardians. The institutions play
these roles to different extents, but
they have made significant progress
in creating cross-frontier policies.
These are compulsory for each mem-
ber state, and provide equal regula-
tion beyond the nation state, the
traditional setting for politics. The
European Union, for a significant
example, affects increasingly specific
fields of politics. Diverging from its
original aim, i.e. creating a single
market, the Union expands its influ-
ence and introduces common policies
on traditionally national fields such
as the juridical system, security and
foreign affairs. 
On the other side of public life, as a
reaction to interstate cooperation
and the global activity of multina-
tional companies, civil societies more
frequently coordinate their activities
on an international level. If decision
making rises from national to inter-
national level then interest groups
have to move part of their lobby-
activities to this level, too: “[C]ivil
society has sought to achieve its
aims by networking with political
officials in governments and interna-
tional organisations. Relationships
with the UN provided NGOs with a
stage for voicing their concerns and
a primary point of access to the
international political process in the
form of international negotiations
orchestrated by intergovernmental
organisation.” (Price, 1998: 623-624).
Parallel demonstrations of millions
against war in Iraq illustrate well
the power of international organisa-
tion. They also show that people
consider the problems to be global
rather than local. It is interesting
that anti-globalisation protests and
organisations utilise the instru-
ments of globalisation and are diffi-
cult to regard as anything other
than global movements. Some, like
the followers of the Hungarian, so-
called “alter-glob” movement, do not
define themselves as anti-globalisers
but as members of a movement
fighting for a different, better global-
isation.
An example of global civil coopera-
tion that has often been quoted is
the successful campaign to ban land-
mines, initiated among others by the
Human Rights Watch. This multina-
22
tional, non-governmental organisa-
tion has achieved the international
ban of the weapon and won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. The cam-
paign for global civil cooperation
naturally has its historic origins in
the first period of globalisation. A
civil organisation, similar to the
anti-landmine campaign led by the
charismatic Judy Williams, was
already created in the 19th century,
which launched an effective cam-
paign against the brutal exploitation
of Congo by Belgium and activated
the intelligentsia of several Western
countries (see for example the
awareness-raising book of Adam
Hochschild, Hochschild 1998).
Differences are, however, more
apparent than the alleged similari-
ties. The campaign remained a pri-
marily British initiative and has
never become global in the way that
civil co-operations do today. At that
time organising, distributing
detailed information and involving
supporters lasted for years. Today,
all of them are literally done in just
one click. Finally, it is a very impor-
tant difference that while an inter-
national campaign, organised
against the horrors committed in the
name of King Leopold of Belgium,
was a curiosity at the end of the 19th
and beginning of the 20th century,
today the cooperation of complex
networks of civil organisations is an
intrinsic characteristic of civil socie-
ty (Keck-Sikkink, 1998). 
Along such networks, i.e. as a result
of economic, governmental and civil
cooperation, social classes are evolv-
ing that can now be called global.
By global class we mean social
groups that possess similar value
systems, opinions and a certain feel-
ing of belonging or sense of identity,
regardless of their nationality. The
most well-known of such classes is
the group of international experts
and managers representing multi-
national companies world-wide.
These “global mercenaries” change
workplace yearly or even more
often, expand their knowledge on
different professional fields and feel
at ease in many parts of the world.
Parallel to this class there is anoth-
er class of international experts,
which is meant to promote the glob-
al concentrations of governmental
institutions. This group consists of
executive and administrative tech-
nocrats, the representatives of sev-
eral inter-governmental organisa-
tions (IMF, World Bank, NATO,
etc.), including smaller, specialized
organisations like international
criminals courts as well (Sassen,
2006; Bauman, 2002). These are the
unambiguous, easily identifiable 23
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global classes, since their profession
and way of life implies joint experi-
ence and common beliefs. Peter L.
Berger refers to Samuel
Huntington‘s “Davos Culture” and
describes these groups and their
cultural appearance in his essay
Four faces of global culture as fol-
lows: “This culture is globalised as a
direct accompaniment of global eco-
nomic processes. Its carrier is inter-
national business. It has obvious
behavioural aspects that are direct-
ly functional in economic terms,
behaviour dictated by the accou-
trements of contemporary business.
Participants in this culture know
how to deal with computers, cellular
phones, airline schedules, currency
exchange, and the like. But they
also dress alike, exhibit the same
amicable informality, relieve ten-
sions through similar attempts at
humour, and of course most of them
interact in English. Since most of
these cultural traits are of Western
(and mostly American) provenance,
individuals coming from different
backgrounds must go through a
process of socialization that will
allow them to engage in this behav-
iour with seemingly effortless spon-
taneity. (Berger, 1997: 24).
Besides the above mentioned group
of global “mercenaries” cooperation
is also strengthening among those
who do not live cosmopolitan lives,
nor does their work have any inter-
national aspects but whose fight
against certain social problems
forge them into an international
community. They form the backbone
of the international civil cooperation
(Sassen, 2006). Hence “global identi-
ty” is not the privilege of the execu-
tives of multinationals only but it is
a phenomenon that encompasses an
increasing spectrum of social
groups. Global identity reflects not
only the values of technocrats and
groups promoting free trade. The
attitudes of politically conscious
groups who reflect on the values of
the previous groups can be consid-
ered a form of global identity as
well. In his cultural-anthropological
study Berger observes the formation
of an international “faculty club”
that intends to export and univer-
salize the values of Western intellec-
tuals. Their occasionally market-
critical views often lead to con-
frontations with their Davos culture
counterparts thus making domestic
ideological conflicts international
(Berger cites the American anti-
smoking movement as a case in
point). 
24
3 Thus named by Huntington, after the participants of the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum (WEF) hosted
by the Swiss town, Davos.
Media and communication are fur-
ther fields where traditionally
national structures take interna-
tional forms. The intensifying com-
mercial relations of the 19th century
necessitated the establishment of
news agencies. Havas (the prede-
cessor of the present Agence France
Presse) was founded in the first
half of the century. The British and
German counterparts, Reuters and
Wolff, were established by ex-
employees of Havas. At the begin-
ning of the 20th century they were
joined by two other agencies, still
dominant today, the American
Associated Press (AP) and the
United Press International
(Thompson, 1995: 154-157). With
the help of telegraph, telephone and
telex they brought closer and closer
many parts of the world. The new
instruments of the 20th century,
especially television, mobile tech-
nologies and the Internet trans-
formed global media even more rad-
ically. In other words, national
news media gave way to the rise of
global news and media empires.
This does not refer to ownership
exclusively. Only because Time
Warner (CNN, Warner Bros. HBO,
etc.), or News Corporation (Fox
News, Twentieth Century Fox, etc.)
rule international media and televi-
sion empires, they are not automat-
ically global. What really makes
them global is that the content
their channels broadcast attracts
an international audience. When
CNN was founded in 1980, it built
its business model on the founda-
tion that there was a demand for
international newscasting. The
establishment of such a network
has since proved to be an accurate
recognition of the opportunities pro-
vided by globalisation. The model
has been copied several times. The
foundation of the Arabic equivalent
of CNN, Al-Jazeera (even if it is
seen as propaganda by many) indi-
cates that more and more, greatly
isolated regions are joining the
processes of globalisation on many
new levels. 
The above considered fields, politics,
economy and trade belong to the
most traditional segments of global-
isation, even if within their scope
we looked at new developments. For
example, this arises when dis-
cussing strengthening civil coopera-
tion. However, the most interesting
areas from the point of view of the
present study are those where from
day to day, ordinary people
encounter the opportunities offered
by globalisation. 25
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Another effect of globalisation is the
strengthening of cultural con-
sumerism. On the one hand this
refers to everything that might be
called everyday culture: television
programmes, feature films and best-
sellers. But for those who keep their
distance from the McCulture it can
be highlighted that globalisation is
not simply about the spread of
Dallas, the Disneyworld and the
culinary supply of the McDonald’s.
It is an element of globalisation that
exhibitions of the world’s greatest
museums can be visited on the
Internet (which also contains an
unbelievable mass of cultural and
scientific information). Another
aspect is that while in the first peri-
ods of globalisation it was only the
privilege of the rich to travel, now
many young people are able to study
abroad and visit foreign countries.
Today travel has become available
for the middle class, hence for a very
significant part of the population.
Also in Hungary, the scale of oppor-
tunities offered by the international
cuisine beyond the McDonald’s chain
is widening.
The world of sports is globalising,
too. Supporting a local club and
cheering at its games is no longer
exclusively the tradition of patriots
(Rowe, 2003). FC Barcelona and
Real Madrid fans or supporters of
Manchester United and Juventus
FC in Turin can now be found all
over the world. Numerous sports
events lose their local characteristics
and become international via televi-
sion. Those, which have always been
international, cease to be abstract
global events and become palpable,
concrete experiences thanks to tele-
vision broadcasting: “The modern
Olympic Games are, via media, the
most widely shared regular event in
human history…No other event in
human history can claim the two bil-
lion or more live viewers who tune
in to the Olympics or the ‘Copa
Mundial del Futbol’ … For the first
time, we can speak of a truly global
ritual.” (Michael Real, 1989: 222-
223). 
Undoubtedly, aside from all their
advantages, certain features of the
global changes can be considered
negative. In connection with the
globalisation of sports through the
media, David Rowe draws our atten-
tion to the dangers of commercial-
ization. Herbert Schiller, a promi-
nent, radical critic of globalisation
sees the commercial advertisements
26
on the uniforms of athletes as “a
concerted assault of corporate mar-
keting values on global conscious-
ness” (Schiller, 1991: 24). Schiller in
agreement with several other ana-
lysts has fought against American
cultural imperialism for decades.
According to him, what we call glob-
alisation is practically no more than
the American media and economy
becoming international. Schiller also
rejects the idea that a globalising
culture could be a mixture consist-
ing of many components and inte-
grating different cultural effects.
Brazilian soap operas for example,
which are very popular in certain
parts of the world unlike the
American ones, are simply creolized
versions of the American originals in
his opinion. 
The danger that the numerous
diverse local cultures might be
taken over by a single uniform and
global culture and that the USA
could play a hegemonic role in inter-
national relationships, troubles
many people. In most aspects of
globalisation, however, such worry
seems exaggerated. According to
Anthony Giddens, “globalisation is
becoming increasingly decentralized
– not under the control of any group
of nations and still less of the large
corporations” (Giddens, 1999: 16).
This is underpinned by the theory of
Manuel Castells, discussed in more
detail later. An international system
dominantly built on networks, he
says, precludes the existence and
the possibility of the existence of
any hegemonic role. 
The opportunities of the USA, the
single super power today, are limit-
ed both diplomatically and militari-
ly. This has been proved, among
other events, by the war on Iraq.
The economic position of the USA is
fading relatively as the rise of the
two Asian giants, China and India
continuously decrease the influence
of the USA in the international
economy (see among others
Economists, 12/06/2007). It is symp-
tomatic in this respect and some-
what frightening too that China has
overtaken the United States as the
world’s largest emitter of carbon
dioxide according to an article pub-
lished in the Guardian on 20 June
2007. Not only the economic domi-
nance of the USA is decreasing, but
also weakening is the cultural hege-
mony. The revival of cultures is an
evident world-wide process from
27
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Catalonia, Wales, and Scotland to
Quebec and Kurdistan, just to men-
tion a few frequently quoted exam-
ples. According to certain analysts
the project of globalisation has not
only failed but we are witnessing
the return of tribes. Old traditions
are so strong in Africa, for example,
that any “globalizer”, let it be
Muslim or Christian missionary or
ultra-rational charity worker, they
will strike serious barriers in their
work. The power of local culture and
local traditions is stronger than that
of the newly offered universalist val-
ues: “When Global Man goes home,
the shaman returns” (Peters, 2006).
Finally, it is an important and evi-
dent supposition that in practice,
peoples’ lives take place in a local
context, however strong the global
influences may be (Wolf, 2004: 16).
Apart from a very narrow, truly cos-
mopolitan group, we live in physical-
ly very limited spaces, which plays
central role in the mediation of val-
ues and culture.
Herbert Schiller’s critique on televi-
sion is well-known, namely that by
its very nature it is incapable of
interactivity and transmits culture
unilaterally. At the same time, his
insight is less valid regarding the
Internet, the new instrument shap-
ing global culture. Internet is
undoubtedly interactive and opens
up opportunities for users to share
their own culture, opinion and ideol-
ogy. An extreme case in point here is
the Islamic terrorist organisations’
skilful Internet use, but online com-
munities provide numerous positive
examples as well for the meeting,
the constructive clash and the mix-
ing of cultures and opinions.
Television is less and less exclusive-
ly “Western”. Still, the Internet con-
tinues to be mostly available for the
users in industrialized countries
(digital equity will be referred to
later on). But this is changing rapid-
ly, and statistics clearly show that
the World Wide Web is becoming
world-wide indeed. This is, among
other factors, due to the recognition
that integrating into global process-
es, and maintaining economic and
intellectual competitiveness is
unimaginable in the medium term
without connecting to the Internet.
Therefore, the international develop-
28
ment and charity organisations
regard it their crucial task to dis-
seminate cheap PCs and mobile
technologies in developing countries.
Although from a very low base,
growth is impressive in Africa and
very dynamic in Asia and Latin
America where the starting point is
more favourable (Internet World
Stats). The situation with mobile
phones is similar: while the propor-
tion of land lines grows very slowly
in Africa, mobile phones have
reached nearly 10% penetration
within 10 years, increasing continu-
ously (International
Telecommunication Union). What it
definitively implies is that Internet
and mobile technologies strengthen
the heterogeneity of international
cultures and not the hegemony of
the USA.
Local cultures will not vanish and
nation state is not dead yet either.
Quite the contrary, states are indis-
pensable in the successful economic
participation in the globalisation
processes (Wolf, 2004: 276-277) as
well as in the solutions of local prob-
lems and for the strengthening of
the social and cooperative communi-
ty. Martin Wolf, a committed sup-
porter of free trade notes that the
winner states of the global economy
are far from being weak. Weak
states, especially those who are on
the verge of collapse do not attract
capital but frighten it away. A state
is demanded primarily as the guar-
antee of security and rule of law
which are essential in commercial
life. Nevertheless, experience shows
that those who think that the state’s
“night watchman” role, i.e. the lais-
sez-faire system is the most success-
ful in the global competition are
wrong. States investing in knowl-
edge and social security can be very
successful in the global economy as
indicated by the achievements of the
Scandinavian countries.
Furthermore, nation states that
painstakingly define long-term
investments and priorities and lay
emphasis on equity and social secu-
rity thus involving more people and
talent into global competition will
consequently be more successful. 
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Globalisation ante portas 
In the contemporary period of glob-
alisation numerous processes take
place at a much higher speed than
ever before. Several phenomena that
used to be the privilege of the elite
become available for wider groups of
society, in more and more countries
of the world. Globalisation is a sig-
nificantly quicker and more wide-
spread transformation than any
similar historic processes. The upper
class-led international relationships
give place to a world that is glob-
alised on every level. Both the speed
and the scope of the phenomenon
demands rapid adaptation and that
an ever growing part of the popula-
tion gain access to the instruments
of globalisation. 
It can not be claimed, however, that
globalisation is an irreversible
process. For among other reasons,
the fact that the nation state still
plays a big role in maintaining
international relations also means
that at the same time it significantly
withholds the progress of globalisa-
tion. Unilaterally it cannot be
judged but if more key countries of
the global economic processes with-
drew from these for a reason, then it
would have an effect on the whole.
Some analysts say that globalisation
has already stuck and slowed down
partially in connection with the col-
lapse of the WTO Doha Round
(Abdelal-Segal, 2007: 104). Others
warn referring to the experiences of
the past that the globalisation
process is vulnerable and fragile
30
4 According to the theory of Polányi, the excessive growth of the market and the dominance of free trade generated
authoritarian expansion between the two world wars, because societies based on liberal economies had neglected
the social elements of development. The growth of social tension predictably created counteraction. One movement is
therefore the economic liberalism and the resulted growing social tensions and the other one is the appearance of
social actions and measures that balance the first.
(Ferguson, 2005). It cannot be ruled
out that, like the first wave of mod-
ern globalisation, the excess freedom
of capital and the assumed or real
extent of inequalities will again pro-
voke a “double movement”3, identi-
fied by Károly Polányi and result in
social seclusion and possibly, conflict
(Polányi, 2004). It is another ques-
tion whether the peaceful or the con-
flict version is desirable, if any. 
Instead of deeming globalisation
dead too early or mourning over the
negative effects it is more useful to
get prepared and seize the opportu-
nities globalisation offers and trans-
form them so that it better matches
our sense of equity. In the form of
civil and academic cooperation, glob-
alisation networks have prospects to
indirectly or even directly influence
the decision making forums where
international economic, environmen-
tal protection and safety policy regu-
lations are issued and framework
agreements and global political solu-
tions are worked out. Direct influ-
ence is realised through internation-
al civil societies whose membership
is generally open to anyone interest-
ed in participating in the work of
the given organisation. Indirect
influence is facilitated by the public
discourse – thus hopefully with the
help of the present study – the
media, and conviction or political
pressure placed on local decision
makers. The extent to which these
processes be can transformed is
largely determined by our attitude
towards globalisation, our willing-
ness to take part and our actual par-
ticipation in the global processes. 
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sation and
mobility
3.1 Trapped by negative 
attitudes 
Do Hungarians speak or think 
of globalisation at all? It is an 
undeniable fact that the different
media do not burst with debates 
on the question nor are the streets
loud with the word globalisation.
And even if some do reflect 
upon the issue, everybody can easily
have their own different interpreta-
tion on the complex concept. It is
clear that we do not all mean the
same by the word “globalisation”
and we definitely cannot expect 
that people’s mental map contains
all aspects of globalisation. It is
therefore absolutely essential what
processes we associate with this
fashionable term and consequently
what kinds of attitudes we adopt
towards them. 
The Hungarian interpretation of
the main processes in the world
depends on the following question:
does fear rule public opinion or do
we attempt to strike balance based
on facts and therefore reach conclu-
sions that describe the complexity
of the world supposedly more gen-
uinely. It is not a novelty for those
who follow the present Hungarian
public discourse that for the time
being, the first scenario is preva-
lent. Loyal to the most beautiful
traditions of the Hungarian culture
of complaining, only the negative
effects of the changes and their
malicious spread in Hungary are
talked about. 
The defensive and complaining atti-
tude – even if well-founded – does
not facilitate the recognition and
exploitation of the advantages that
globalisation opens up in everyday
life. The main results of globalisa-
tion manifest in our everyday life,
the “lifeworld”, therefore individu-
als have to become aware of their
own responsibility. In order to pre-
vent negative attitudes from becom-
ing self-fulfilling prophesies, every-
body has to recognize the effects of
globalisation in their own life and
find the opportunities by which
they can improve it themselves.34
3. GLOBALISATION 
AND MOBILITY
One of the most frequent of the
moaning opinions in the Hungarian
public discourse is the vanishing of
our own culture and the fear from
the phantom of a uniform world.
One factor in the growth of such
panic could be the dumping of
Anglo-Saxon cultural products in the
Hungarian market throughout the
last decade. In most of the cases,
concerns are apparently caused by
other changes in the immediate
environment such as the appearance
of multinational companies. 
Globalisation is identified world-
wide with multinational companies
such as McDonald’s or Coca Cola.
No wonder that also for many in
Hungary the main direction of the
world’s development is represented
by fast food chains and giant shop-
ping centres. The unequal fight
between recently arrived big compa-
nies and small businesses struggling
for their survival turns our attention
towards another inbred stereotype
according to which the money is
omnipotent in our age and the
strong always defeats the weak.
Many say that this is the real face of
globalisation, the world of winners
and losers: it fattens the developed
world and a narrow elite among the
countries in question, while at the
same time, masses of others struggle
for existence. 
Criticism in Hungary – and nearly
everywhere else in the world – cen-
tres on the ruthless moneymaking of
global capitalism that totally disre-
gards any spiritual aspects of
human life. The new world pro-
claims the glory of materialism and
cannot cope with values beyond,
such as love, selflessness, belief and
devotion and therefore it disrespects
them.
According to other opinions, globali-
sation can be condemned primarily
for the acceleration of the rhythm
of life. In the giant pool of informa-
tion and in the world of opening
opportunities many have the
impression that the urge to keep up
the pace, learn continuously and do
well at work leads to the deteriora-
tion of human relationships. It is
apparent to those critics that time
is lost in the endless pursuit of
these ambitions. According to this
reasoning the curses of the new
world are the lack of time and the
35
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general feeling that “everybody is
running and we do not talk any-
more”. 
The above opinions prove that
Hungary is in line with the interna-
tional trend. As far as globalisation
is concerned, the not-too-dynamic
public discourse as well as the eco-
nomic dimensions are dominated by
macro-level factors. Therefore it is
rather predictable that globalisation
on the whole has been fixed as a
series of negative processes in peo-
ple’s mind. This incomplete picture
needs to be developed. It does not
seem to be an impossible task, how-
ever, because in Hungary – similarly
to most parts of Europe – we per-
ceive several tendencies that can
improve the quality of our life. This
is exactly what stands in the focus of
the present study. Namely, it
intends to draw attention to the
everyday opportunities of globalisa-
tion. The unprecedented abundance
of goods, the chances offered by geo-
graphical mobility and the Internet-
related changes in everyday life are
now tangible phenomena for the
bulk of society. However, according
to the standpoint of DEMOS
Hungary Foundation, we are not
sufficiently aware of these opportu-
nities.
As far as the abundance of goods is
concerned, there is no longer need
for such shopping tours as those at
the end of the 80s, referred to as
“Gorenje tourism”. Practically any
consumer goods can now be pur-
chased in Hungary. The develop-
ment is evident, in terms of supply
Hungary has never been so close to
the developed Western countries. At
the same time, it is less mentioned
that the fiercely criticised multina-
tionals have largely contributed to
such abundance of goods. 
Similarly, the sharp rise in the
opportunities to travel and to work
abroad is an unfairly neglected
issue. Still, the question remains; is
there any willingness to live with
them? Definitely, when it comes to
one or two week long trips, evidence
shows that those experiences are
frequently indulged. On the other
hand, it is common that people
would not work abroad even if they
earned much more. It is understand-
able, when people argue against
labour mobility saying that “this is
36
where I grew up, this is where my
family is”. Still, this attitude of
seclusion prevents individuals, often
permanently, from the opportunity
of attaining professional expertise,
language knowledge and often finan-
cial progress with the help of a one
or two year job abroad.
Another important component is
the Internet whose appreciation is
undivided among its users.
Unfortunately they are the minori-
ty. Hungary is among the lower
third of European countries with
respect to the proportion of regular
Internet users. The problem here is
also the negative attitude. A signifi-
cant majority of non-users have no
financial reasons but they do not
utilize the internet because of cog-
nitive barriers (they are not inter-
ested in the Internet, they do not
know what it is good for). It is in
this way that they remain distant
from the global flow of information
(Dessewffy-Rét, 2004). 
We are convinced that the aware-
ness of facts, trends, and informa-
tion on broadening opportunities can
eliminate numerous earlier stereo-
types and attitudes that are deeply
rooted in the Hungarian society. We
believe that the analysis and discus-
sion of the above described new phe-
nomena that emerge in everyday life
can help us overcome our reflexive
negative approach. The following
pages, therefore, provide an
overview on the global and domestic
changes that contribute to the trans-
formation of the lifeworld. Several
data illustrate the main tendencies
of geographical and intellectual
mobility and serve as a basis for the
analysis to what extent Hungary
has become part of these processes.
3.2 Intellectual mobility 
Globalisation has no other aspect
that provokes such emotions as cul-
tural globalisation. General knowl-
edge about the term usually stops
with the Americanization of the
world and that global consumer
goods are spreading explosively,
endangering our own culture. We
believe, however, that cultural glob-
alisation entails much more than
that. As the most fundamental
process of our age it is in fact noth-
ing else but intellectual mobility. It
affects an ever growing group of peo-
ple and anyone is able to take
advantage of it. 
Cultures of different nations have
always influenced each other and
the concept of cultural globalisation
could be applied to any historical 37
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age. However, the term is mainly
used to describe the processes that
have run from the beginning of the
20th century and are still carrying on
today. This has evolved particularly
because the accelerated cultural
globalisation of our age is a qualita-
tively different period in history.
Due to the emergence of new tech-
nologies, instruments of telecommu-
nication and international media
companies the global circulation of
information has dramatically accel-
erated, become varied and is spread-
ing in an unprecedented manner.
Contrary to the opinion of those
opposing cultural globalisation, we
argue that this process indeed has a
possible interpretation that present-
ing the advantages and the tangible
results verifies the opportunities
opening up for society. In our under-
standing, information that becomes
freely accessible and derives from
wide sources, together with the
rapid spread of new scientific and
cultural achievements promotes
mobility. We can only have doubt as
far as our own capability is con-
cerned in taking these opportunities.
It is important to emphasise once
more that the role of individuals
becomes crucial in this matter. We
ourselves are responsible for the
exploitation of the free access to
information and the global cultural
exchanges. We must be proficient in
using the knowledge conveyed by
new technologies in order to achieve
our own goals. 
Digital revolution 
Cultural globalisation can not be
interpreted without the concept of
digital revolution. It involves the
continuous development of informa-
tion technology and the means of
telecommunication as well as the
parallel decrease in their price. As a
result of these factors, within a few
years the development of informa-
tion and communication technology
has completely transformed the
economy, culture and mass commu-
nication of the whole world.
It is not being questioned anymore
that one, if not the most, important
catalyst of the digital revolution is
the Internet. Besides making freely
accessible a previously unimaginable
wealth of information, this network
allows everybody to study using
enormous resources and establish
contact with almost anyone disre-
garding geographical distance.38
Thanks to this electronic global com-
munication, people with completely
different cultural backgrounds are
able to communicate in a common
virtual space. 
The spread of digital technologies
and the Internet as well as the
expansion of the users’ circle contin-
ues to be a very rapid process. While
at the beginning of the 90s less than
three million people used the
Internet world-wide, today an esti-
mated 900 million users surf the
web. According to certain sugges-
tions it is utterly unnecessary to
quote numbers because the Internet
is spreading at such a speed that
only proportions can be ascertained,
precise data become irrelevant with-
in less than a few months. The most
probable calculations testify that the
number of PCs connected to the
Internet increases by an average of
10-15% every month. 
And this comes as no surprise: the
options available on the Internet are
expanding at an unbelievable speed.
Less than one and a half decades
ago only universities and some pub-
lic institutions with a very modern
approach owned a homepage. Today,
many services are available on the
Internet. Books, theatre and cinema
tickets, but also cars and holidays
can easily be found and purchased.
Thanks to the size of the virtual
market it is especially favourable
that prices are easily comparable,
better offers are simpler to find and
even rare products are often avail-
able that are otherwise difficult to
buy. While earlier the owner of a
rare good could not really find a
potential buyer who lived far away,
now Internet provides the means for
both of them. 
In the European Union every second
person (54 per cent of the popula-
tion) uses the Internet while in
Eastern Europe only 27 per cent
accesses it and their majority uses it
only at their workplace. This ratio is
relatively low compared to the aver-
age of the EU, and especially hum-
ble if we consider that in the United
States of America 77% of the popu-
lation is Internet savvy (Bognár-
Galácz, 2004). In Hungary 36% of
people above 14 years use the
Internet which falls short of the
European average and the growth
rate is slow, around 4% annually.
Significant differences persist in the 39
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proportion of users within different
demographic groups which indicates
that the digital gap is large. For
example, nearly 90% of the 14-17
year olds use the Internet, but this
ratio is only 38% among the 40-49
year olds and 4% among those who
are older than 60 years. Similarly,
big differences exist with respect to
education level and the degree of
urbanisation of residence.
Household Internet access is also
worse than the European average.
In 2006 21% of Hungarian house-
holds had an Internet connection. It
is promising, however, that broad-
band access shows growing tenden-
cy: in 2003 only 30% of all connec-
tions were of this kind, whereas in
2006 75% of households with access
used broadband connection. 
40
For years, the most frequent
Internet activity in Hungary has
been the use of e-mail (84 per cent)
but searching for information is sim-
ilarly popular. Furthermore, two
thirds of the Internet users play
games regularly and almost 50% use
the web for online communication.
The majority of people who read
homepages in a foreign language
(40% of users) visit English sites
dominantly. German sites are visit-
ed only by significantly less people,
about a third of those who browse
English sites. 
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Figure 1 – Spread of home PCs and the Internet in Hungary: proportion of households with
access (1992-2006) (%)
In conclusion, the above data shows
that Hungary is significantly lag-
ging behind even its immediate
neighbours in terms of distribution
of the Internet. At the same time,
the digital revolution is undeniably
present in our everyday life.
Considering the fact that indicators
are much more favourable among
the youth, it is reasonable to assume
that with time, Hungary and its citi-
zens will be able to take advantage
of the opportunities of globalisation
and its most effective transmitter,
the Internet.
Global networks and global
language 
Contrary to the critical assumptions,
cultural globalisation is not a cultur-
al attack organised by a few world-
wide companies with the intention
to homogenise the taste and opinion
of people in order to exercise power
over them. It is in fact an array of
horizontal networks operated by
individuals and their own communi-
ties. Centralized information centres
gave place to freely accessible net-
works. See for example the user-
edited Wikipedia that is indeed reli-
able and has more up-to-date infor-
mation than any other encyclopae-
dia in the world. Such networks
have ultimately ruled out the possi-
bilities of controlling the information
flow. Therefore the criticism does
not hold at all that cultural globali-
sation is nothing but a process
forced on us from above. Although
nodes exist in these global informa-
tion networks (Castells, 2005), there
is neither a centre nor a hierarchy.
Networks cannot be controlled, that 41
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Figure 2 – Distribution of selected online activities among Internet users (proportion of those
who use the given activities with a certain frequency), 2006 (%)
is, according to Castells, a network
is the only system that is able to
grow in undetermined directions
and learn without control.
Everything else poses topological
barriers in front of the possible pro-
ceedings. A network barely contains
edges or borders,: it is open, no mat-
ter where it is approached from. It
can be stated that a network is the
least structural among all organisa-
tions that are structured at all. This
multitude of diverging components
can only stay coherent within the
framework of a network. No other
arrangements – chain, pyramid,
tree, circle, spoke – are able to oper-
ate real diversity in unity (cited by
Dessewffy, 2004: 32).
New technologies and telecommuni-
cation channels greatly facilitated
the development of global communi-
cation, but there is another shared
instrument that assisted the
process. In the intercultural
exchange of information the real
explosion was created by a common
language. Today, this is the English
language, the lingua franca of cul-
tural globalisation (Held et al, 1999).
This is the language in which we
use many services on the World
Wide Web and what we use in most
of the cases when communicating
with other participants of global
society. According to surveys, 80% of
stored electronic data is in English.
The dominance of English has
increased especially in scientific life.
Studies that are not written in
English or have not been translated
after publication are not linked to
the scientific mainstream and thus
are in fact condemned to death. The
dominance of the English language
is also reflected by the fact that
books written in French, German,
Japanese, Dutch, Spanish and
Swedish are translated into English
in the biggest number since this is
the language in which most people
understand them (Held et al, 1999).
Global network contacts are realised
with the help of English, but it is
not to be feared that due to the dom-
inance of the English language,
Internet communications in national
languages would disappear. 
In crucial areas, such as the inter-
national scientific cooperation and
diplomacy, the dominance of
English language is a noteworthy
phenomenon. In this arena it has
significantly promoted the scope42
and effectiveness of international
cooperation. Nevertheless, the
growth of English in these fields
does not contradict the support of
the Internet in the strengthening of
local cultures as well. The Internet,
just like the book in its own time, is
the cultural medium of our age that
can afford new opportunities and
forums for the spread and strength-
ening of national ideas (Anderson,
1983). English replaces by no
means the role of national lan-
guages nor does it substitute them.
Nevertheless, it is very practical
that a universal language exists by
which we all understand each other
regardless our mother tongue. The
spread of the Internet indicates
that this process confirms the
preservation of national cultures
and strengthens, rather than dam-
ages, cultural identity. This is
underpinned by the growing num-
ber of Internet services that are
now available in different national
languages and the development of
virtual societies of forums that are
designed for individual users, like
iwiw. During the years 1999 and
2000 two languages have spread
the most on the European web,
Catalan and Dutch. English is still
the prevailing language but its pro-
portion in all the web pages is
decreasing (Castells-Ince, 2003).
Hungary, with respect to foreign
language use is rather backwards.
According to the latest survey of
the Economist Intelligence Unit,
among the countries of the
European Union it is Hungary
where the least people speak for-
eign languages. In the Census 2001
only 20% of the population claimed
that they spoke at least one lan-
guage besides their mother tongue.
Before the political transition, in
the 60s the proportion of people
speaking English was negligible
and even in the 80s only half as
many people spoke English than
German. By 2001 not only has the
proportion of both English and
German speakers rapidly increased
but they have nearly levelled off.
Interestingly, the number of
Russian speakers has also
increased in spite of the fact that it
is no longer a compulsory subject at
school.
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This indicates positive progress
and that as a result of education
reforms, the choice of foreign
languages is wider and language
learning is compulsory already
in the elementary education.
Furthermore, in contrast with
the period of seclusion before the
90s, a great part of the popula-
tion has realised again the value
of speaking foreign languages.
Effect of globalisation on
cultural supply and identity
Our most immediate encounter with
globalisation is probably the enor-
mous change in our culture. A great
number of examples illustrate that
cultural production and consump-
tion have developed into a global
system. For instance, the day after
the American premier of a Bruce
Willis film, its pirate copy is avail-
able on the markets of Shanghai,
the skilled can download it from the44
Figure 3: Foreign language knowledge of the population in European comparison 
Figure 4: Foreign language knowledge by languages (%!)
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S O U R C E :  OM, 2001 OM – Ministry of Education
Internet immediately, and in two
weeks time we can all see it in a
cinema in Budapest. What is new
about globalisation is not that inter-
nationally distributed cultural prod-
ucts reach us, since we have always
been watching American films, but
the new novelty of globalisation is
the simultaneousness. Via the com-
munication channels of globalisa-
tion, the same cultural product
reaches millions of people almost at
the same time, in any corner of the
world. 
Along the lines of simultaneousness,
a certain common sense of identity
evolves. According to conservative
criticism, it is simply caused by the
dominance of the international pen-
etration of world brands. In our
opinion, however, it is mainly due to
the fact that now we can create our
cultural identity within new struc-
tures. One of the most important
accompanying phenomenona of
globalisation is the earlier described
deterritorialization (i.e. loss of the
traditional role of territories). This
diminishes the significance of geo-
graphical location to the flow of cul-
tural experience (Tomlinson, 2003).
As a result, cultural experience is
lifted out from its traditional locali-
ty. We may be at the same geo-
graphical distance from each other
as before, but this is no longer the
determinant of our cultural identity.
Since the 18th century, national
identity has been the main mode of
expressing belonging and individu-
als have not enjoyed considerable
freedom of identity. Today, cultural
existence is affected by globalised
influences, forces and experiences
(Tomlinson, 2003). A boy from
Kenya wearing a Beckham jersey is
at the very same time a Kenyan, a
member of the Kikuyu tribe (or
Luhya, Luo or Meru) and a
Manchester United fan.
An oft-repeated criticism of cultural
homogenization is that national cul-
tural values become overshadowed
by global culture. It is thought that
the cultural products of many coun-
tries cannot possibly cross the bor-
ders because, lacking in proper tech-
nology, they stand no chances in the
global cultural competition. On the
contrary, in our opinion this novel
circulation favours the world-wide
appearance of local cultures. The
globalisation-enhanced spread of the
Asian countries’ culture (consider 45
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sushi or karaoke) underpins that
ways of presenting local cultures
indeed exist and that it is not a one-
way process. 
The rapid exchange of cultural prod-
ucts implies increasing supply. We
do not have to be content anymore
with just reading Hungarian dailies,
and we no longer have to wish for a
wider view. At a few clicks of a
mouse we can learn about this
week’s most “in” restaurant in
London or the most fashionable
haircut in New York. In front of the
television, we can support Barcelona
alongside many millions of other
fans. If we are real supporters, and
we have already been to a game in
Barcelona with a cheap flight, we
might prepare for the evening with a
Spanish jamón serrano sandwich as
seen there. In order to do so, we can
simply pop into the nearest shop-
ping centre and find what we need
between the German ham and the
Italian salami. This cultural trans-
formation entails a qualitative and
quantitative revolution with great
implications for everyday life. Where
this process will end, cannot yet be
predicted.
Besides providing cultural diversity
and abundant supply, cultural glob-
alisation – and primarily the
Internet – has community-creating
power as well. Several examples
prove that such growth of intellectu-
al mobility is able to bring together
producers and consumers who have
been working in their isolated imme-
diate environment and who have
never before had the chance to find
partners. It is the network operated,
horizontally connected organisations
that play the most important roles
in the development of various sub-
cultures. They offer an alternative
global culture to the one that is seen
as homogenous and extensively uni-
form by many.
A case study on nu jazz (Vályi, 2004)
has proved the importance of the
Internet in cross border, bottom-up
cultural production. With its help,
subcultural forms reach consumers
at places where they are not
ensured by the mainstream market.
46
Moreover, in the analysis of cultural
consumption the significant increase
in choice is noteworthy. Since the
political transition we can choose
from more goods, buy cheaper and
parallel to this, the proportion of for-
eign products (books, films, etc.) is
also growing. As an example, the
total number of copies of books pub-
lished in Hungary in 2004 was 32
million, but as regards the propor-
tions of the domestic market, the
sales of import books was 4 billion
Forint (by 2.5%) more than in the
previous year. This is due to the fact
that after 1990 the general state aid
for publishing was abolished and
since then, the number of copies of
Hungarian books has sharply
dropped. Although the proportion of
books by Hungarian authors has
diminished within all published
books, a greater variety of books are
now available in shops and the sup-
ply side has expanded. 
47
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Figure 5 Total number of copies of published books in given year and the number 
of published titles 
Data on the Hungarian film distri-
bution reveals that from 1995
onwards both the number of newly
released Hungarian films and the
number of viewers have begun to
increase again. In 2000, 63% of film
premiers were American, 7%
English, 7% French, whereas in
2004 a “mere” 50.4% of films
screened in cinemas were
American, 11.9% Hungarian, the
same per cent French and 5.7%
English.
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NKÖM – Ministry of National Cultural Heritage, KSH – Hungarian Central Statistical Office
Although digitally accessible servic-
es and applications offer over-
whelming social advantages, they
are not nearly equal in the differ-
ent parts of the world and in all
segments of global society,
Hungary being no exception.
Chances are that the digital gap
further deepens the economic dif-
ferences between countries. A big
part of everyday life – from work to
learning – is closely dependent on
the Internet, therefore those who
have no access to digital technolo-
gies, cannot benefit from its advan-
tages. In countries where the quali-
ty of Internet access and the
exploitation of information are lim-
ited, the young embark on their
career with much less of a chance
at mobility. Contrary to the often
repeated misconception, the inter-
net is not only a reservoir of shoot-
ing games and stolen music but an
inevitable means of learning. 
Effect of globalisation 
on education
One generation ago, international
relationships did not influence the
actual existence of universities.
Today, however, participating in the
global environment is indispensable
for every institution of higher educa-
tion. In the global, knowledge-based
economies, the role of institutions of
higher education is more important
than ever: they are the key figures in
cross-border scientific cooperation,
and the circulation of students,
knowledge and information. Not
every university is international, but48
Figure 6 Number of viewers of newly released feature films 
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KSH – Hungarian Central Statistical Office
they are all participants, winners or
losers in the global processes.
Therefore, in several countries politi-
cal discussions prioritise the
enhancement of international mobili-
ty, the internationalization of educa-
tional institutions, the encourage-
ment of scientific cooperation and
the global competition for human
capital. 
One of the best indicators of intellec-
tual mobility within higher educa-
tion is the proportions of students
studying abroad. Mostly, they are
motivated by the possibility of
knowledge exchange, learning about
another country, its people and their
culture, and/or the opportunity of
gaining experience that would be
impossible to obtain at home. In the
last 20 years, the number of stu-
dents studying abroad in the OECD
countries has doubled, in 2001 a
total of 1.6 million people studied in
49
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Figure 6 Number of foreign students studying in the given country in the last 20 years
a foreign country, 30% of them in
the USA, 14% in England, 13% in
Germany, 9% in France, 7% in
Australia and 4% in Japan. 
Learning abroad, however, is only
one possible medium of mobility. The
number of students is also increas-
ing, for example, who graduated
from a foreign university or partici-
pated in a foreign, postgraduate edu-
cation without leaving their home
country. The number of E-learning
courses and trainings are continu-
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ously growing, and according to a
survey by the OECD, after learning
abroad, this is the most determina-
tive form of student mobility.
During the years spent at foreign
universities, students not only
exchange experiences but develop a
system of personal connections, i.e.
networks, that similar to big inter-
national organisations, mesh the
whole world and create a global
elite. Besides students, institutions
benefit as well: it evidently boosts
their prestige if a foreign student
excels in their institute, simply
because it proves that they provided
a better, more interesting and intel-
lectually more inspiring environ-
ment. Additionally, the forming of
an intellectual elite has cultural
aspects. Due to the mobility in high-
er education, the most educated peo-
ple scatter around the world bring-
ing along their identity and culture
into the host countries, thus serving
as a cultural transfer medium. As a
result, a world-wide cultural
exchange is being realised whose
relevance in the determination of
our future is yet to be discovered. 
Institutions of higher education that
successfully exploit the advantages
of intellectual mobility not only cre-
ate global elite, but also affect the
domestic economy. American elite
universities are characterized by
flexibility, decentralized governance,
intellectual openness, competitive
spirit and devotion to knowledge. As
such, they are considered “hotbeds
of innovation”. This is the attitude
that in the case of Stanford
University has largely contributed
to the development of Silicon Valley
(Castells-Ince, 2006). A similarly
excellent example – returning to the
European continent – is the Helsinki
University of Technology, one of the
best European universities, where
the key to development was indeed
the openness towards international
networking. Without the openness
and scientific expertise of the uni-
versity Nokia could not have become
one of the most recognised compa-
nies in Finland, and around the
world (Castells-Ince, 2006).
The situation in Hungary has radi-
cally changed since the political
transition. In the last twenty years
the number of students studying
abroad has tripled, reflecting the
widening international grant oppor-
tunities and the willingness to take50
them. Some argue, however, that
this indicator should be further
improved because tendencies dis-
cussed above are particularly valid
for Hungarian students and their
future opportunities. 
3.3 Geographical mobility 
Globalisation has implications
beyond the mobility of people them-
selves. We learn, hear and read
about the so far unprecedented
speed of the circulation of goods,
capital, services and information.
Moreover, we ourselves are more
and more often their recipients and
users. None of them are, however, as
observable as, for example, the dom-
inance of foreign students in the
most popular night clubs of the city
who flew to Budapest with a 10 euro
ticket or when someone with from
different culture, and speaking a dif-
ferent language moves into our
neighbourhood. 
Fortunately, the opportunity to
obtain a breadth of perspective and
gain new experiences does to
exclude Hungarians. Thanks to 
less expensive and more expedient
transportation, it is easier today
than ever before to delve into dis-
tant and unfamiliar places, work in
another corner of the world, main-
tain foreign social contacts, and fol-
low foreign cultural trends, that is
just to mention a few advantages. 
People have obviously not been dis-
covering the distant points of the
world or starting new lives there,
solely on the basis of modern global-
isation. In nearly any period of his-
tory, mass migration waves have
been recorded. It is worth emphasis-
ing, however, that the significantly
increased geographical mobility of
the last two decades does not even
compare to the migration data of the
end of the 19th and beginning of the
20th century. As far as the geograph-
ical scope, intensity, and social influ-
ence on both the home countries and
the host countries of our age is con-
cerned, we are witnessing a process
of unprecedented depth. 
Multicultural societies –
Immigration and politics 
In 1980 the UN estimation of immi-
grants in the world was 100 mil-
lion. Today, this number has almost
doubled (in 2006 it was 191 mil-
lion). The largest group of immi-
grants is composed of masses flee- 51
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ing from poverty, war and persecu-
tion (Collett, 2006). Immigration
into Europe has a relatively shorter
history than that towards the USA
and Australia; it practically started
in the second half of the 20th centu-
ry. Despite the fairly short history,
23 million immigrants live in the
EU today who have arrived from
outside the EU countries. Clearly,
the process has not come to an end,
as a wave of 500 thousand illegal
immigrants continue to arrive 
onto the continent each year. Most
of the Western societies have
become multicultural as a result,
and are now facing new social chal-
lenges (e.g. the coexistence of differ-
ent cultures and identities, tension
on the labour market). 
The immigration waves into Europe
in the 1950s and 1960s primarily
concerned the developed, industrial-
ized or former colonizing countries.
The reaction of the time to that
mass immigration was the seclusion
of the 1970s and the constriction of
immigration policy. From the 1980s
on, the immigration tendency has
again begun to accelerate and now
concerns practically the whole of the
continent (Held et al., 1999). 
Since 1996 all the 15 member states
of the “old” EU-15, have experienced
net immigration flow (Collett, 2006).
Among the newcomer states it is
only the Latvians, Lithuanians and
Poles who leave in greater number
than the number of foreigners com-
ing to settle in their countries. It
comes as no surprise that in many
countries, most significantly in
Western European developed coun-
tries, immigration has become the
focus of political infightings. Le
Pen’s qualification for the second
round in the French presidential
elections in 2001, Jörg Haider’s gov-
ernment in Austria, the short-lived
glory of Pim Fortuyn in the
Netherlands, and the activity of
Vlaams Belang, the second
strongest Flemish party in the 2007
elections in Belgium are examples
that show how populist ideology
building on xenophobia can develop
into serious political forces. This
predicament is more likely to occur
in countries where the traditional
political elite has failed to resolve
the cultural and social tension
caused by immigration. 
The clash of values and the fre-
52
quently higher rate of poverty,
unemployment and crime among
immigrants are in one balance of the
scale. Based on the experiences of
previous decades, however, it can be
concluded that an appropriate immi-
gration policy would realise the
needs of the labour market and
recruit a skilled labour force for the
professional shortage areas. This
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Figure 8 – EU tolterance index (EU25 + USA, Japan, Norway, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia)
(1995-200)
S O U R C E : World Values Survey
would ideally stimulate the economy
of the host country and balance the
situation. 
The above data on the prevailing
tendencies shed light on the
Hungarian mentality, namely that
Hungarians have a strong anti-
immigrant attitude in comparison to
other European nations and similar-
ly, are reluctant to move abroad.
The Hungarians’ propensity for
mobility is exceptionally low, both
within the borders and abroad. As
regards migrating from the country
or from the European continent,
Hungary is one of the least mobile
nations in international comparison. 
According to the latest survey con-
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The index measures the societies’ relation to traditions, difference, foreign workers, and considers their
self-expression values. The lower the index, the more dismissive the society. 
ducted in 2007, 29% of Hungarians
can be regarded as xenophobic. The
majority of those represented in the
above table, who are “hesitating”,
would not like to allow in the country
Romanians, Russians, Chinese and
very least least, Arabs. It is an 
unfortunate fact that the proportion
of dismissive people has increased in
Hungary within all ethnic groups
between 2006 and 2007. This phe-
nomenon is likely to slow down the
process of cultural understanding
and is counterproductive concerning
the maximal exploitation of economic,
labour market and cultural opportu-
nities within the European Union.
Special attention has to be turned 
to this retraction and to the 
generally negative tendencies 
regarding immigration. According to
calculations, by 2030 the population
of Hungary, if the present migration
trends continue, might decrease 
from its current level of 10 million 
to 9.6 million. This estimated number
is likely to be worsened further by
the extensive anti-immigration atti-
tude.
Cheaper and faster transport 
The migration explosion of the last
two decades was made possible by
the new technical conditions that
created various opportunities. The
available transportation channels
provided masses of people with the
chance to travel to any obscure place
in the world for an affordable price.
Accordingly, the huge distances of
thousands of kilometres between or
within continents call for the analy-
sis of airline companies and their
traffic, primarily. 
The range of travel opportunities has
broadened significantly since the
turn of the millennium, and the num-
ber of flights, the passenger traffic
and the income of airline companies
have all increased. In 2006 the total
international air passenger traffic
was 740 million people, 37% (more
than 200 million people) greater than
in 2000. The only disruption of the
recent years was due to the tragic
events of 11/9/2001. Despite the rapid
growth following the event, it still
had a prevailing effect. The sector
could not fully recover to perform the
expected increase rate estimated
before the terrorist attacks. In 2006,
it had fallen behind by 5 per cent
(IATA, 2006).
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Figure 9 – World air passengers traffic, 1999-2006
Low-cost airline companies have
participated actively in the growth
of the recent years. Although they
have only so far had outstanding
positive effect on the traffic within
Europe, most airline companies of
the world are pressured to adapt.
The results of the activity of cost
effective low-cost airline companies
have been the restructuring and
more effective operation of flights,
the rationalizing of the cost of the
work, the decrease in the degree of
comfort and consequently the
depression of ticket prices. 
Undoubtedly, a distinct advantage of
the appearance of low-cost airline
companies is that they have gener-
ated a price competition on lines
operated by traditional companies
and provide air connection between
cities that previously had no connec-
tion at all. The advantages are
indeed palpable: they connect new
cities and thus whole new regions to
the international economic and cul-
tural circulation, enhance tourism
and contribute to the geographical
flexibility of employees. Moreover,
cheaper transportation opens up
travel opportunities to wider social
classes. 
Who could have guessed ten years
ago that a low-cost airline company
would become the biggest interna-
tional air passenger carrier of the
world within a short period of time?
Excluding the owners of those air-
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S O U R C E : IATA 2006
line companies, the following data
has come as a surprise to everyone:
in 2006 it was Ryanair that carried
the most passengers, more than 40
million, exceeding Lufthansa, Air
France and British Airways4. The
second biggest low-cost airline com-
pany, easyJet is sixth on the list.
(IATA, 2006). 
The actual increase at exceptional
speed will be further enhanced if, as
expected, the Chinese and Indian mid-
dle-class set out to travel as well. This
evolution is likely, as this class is now
enlarged by both countries’ economic
development and include several hun-
dred million people. The appearance of
a new audience requires adaptation of
the tourist industry and its employees.
Signs in Russian are not a curiosity
anymore on the French Riviera and it
is not unimaginable that within a few
years restaurant owners of the world
will offer their menu, besides English
and French, in Chinese as well. 
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5 Taking into account the domestic air passenger traffic, too, it is the big American airline companies (American Airlines,
Delta Airlines, United Airlines, etc.) that head the list and there is no low-cost company among the first ten. The
advance of low-cost companies is evident mainly in the international air passenger traffic and this is the dimension
where Ryanair and Easyjet have been able to reach their excellent position.
Figure 10 – Number of flights and market share of low-cost carriers, 1991-2007 
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Figure 11 – Market share of low-cost airline companies by European countries,
July–December 2006
The recent success story of low-cost
airline companies is verified by the
growth of their share in the
European market: from 2000 to the
beginning of 2007 it increased from
2% to 16.5% (Eurocontrol, 2006).
Today, the airports of three coun-
tries, Great Britain, Germany and
Spain, are realizing more than half
of the entire low-cost passenger traf-
fic movement. The proportion of low-
cost passenger traffic within the
total passenger traffic is the highest
in the same countries (29 per cent in
the number-one Great Britain).
Through these main hub airports,
flights cover almost the entire area
of the European Union. What is even
more important is that their activity
and market share in every member
state, including Hungary, is rising
continuously. 
S O U R C E :  Eurocontrol 2006
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In Hungary the most obvious
changes in the field of geographical
mobility can be observed in the shift
of emphasis in travel habits and
especially in the radical increase in
air passenger traffic. At the begin-
ning of the 90s, the fall of the iron
curtain generated an increase in the
number of travellers abroad, while a
decade later the low-cost flights,
affordable also for the average citi-
zen, induced still higher passenger
traffic. The number of arriving and
departing flights at Budapest
Ferihegy Airport has more than dou-
bled in the last ten years and due to
the planned future developments, the
expected trend will likely be an
extensive increase. 
As a result of the accession and the
arrival of low-cost airline companies,
the formerly stagnating market of
air transport has begun to develop
explosively. The decreasing prices
and the increasing number of desti-
nations make it possible for many
Hungarians to come into contact
with the cultures of other European
countries. It can be observed that
today the proportion of Hungarians
account for 33 per cent of the entire
passenger traffic of Ferihegy
Airport.
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Global tourism – continuous
growth 
The widening of travel opportunities
resulted directly in the world-wide
recovery of international tourism
industry. The continuous growth of
the last decades broke only twice.
The above mentioned terrorist
attacks resulted in a standstill in
2001 and the war on Iraq and the
Figure 12 – Passenger traffic of Ferihegy Airport
S O U R C E :  Ferihegy Airport
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
HungarianForeigner
1954
1403
8267
2728
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
fear from SARS epidemic led to a
slight decline in 2003. Apart from
those two obstacles and a few other
minor slowdowns, the expansion of
the sector has been exceptional: in
2006 world tourism increased by a
number amounting to the yearly
guest flow of Italy, 36 million people,
which meant that about 850 million
tourists were visiting the world. The
forecasts for the following years are
similarly optimistic. The estimations
of the UN organisation specialised
in world tourism examines the
threatening factors for the sector,
e.g. terrorism, various epidemics,
higher fuel prices that increase the
cost of travels. Even while taking
these threats into account, by 2020
the world tourism market is forecast
to nearly double, which means that
the number of tourists is expected to
swell to 1.6 billion (UNWTO, 2007). 
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Figure 13 – World Tourism Until 2020
The market has become global:
besides traditional destinations in
the European countries and North
America, more and more tourists
visit Asian, South American and
African countries. The world tourism
data of 2006, however, still showed
the dominance of Europe as a desti-
nation (56.5 per cent of all travellers
have chosen European destinations).
18 countries (including Hungary) of
the 25 most visited, and 7 of the 10
most popular countries are
European (UNWTO, 2005a).
1.6 billion
0.85 billion
0.4 billion 
1995                                                 2007                                                       2020
2007 – 4%+
actual
Expected by 2020
S O U R C E :  UNWTO 2007
Europe’s leading position is not
being threatened yet in the short
term, but it has to be taken into
account that other, so far less popu-
lar, destinations realise a higher
rate of growth than the countries of
the old continent. With respect to
continents, in 2006 the tourism of
Africa has increased at the highest
rate (by 8%). Among the countries in
the list of the 25 most visited coun-
tries Egypt, China, Malaysia and
Mexico have increased the most, by
a rate exceeding 10 per cent. Even
among these countries China has to
be highlighted, because by 2020 it
may become the number-one desti-
nation of the world (UNWTO, 2007).
Besides being a destination, Europe
is also a major outbound market. The
top 25 list of international travel
expenditures by countries, led by
Germans and followed by Americans
and the British, include 14 European
countries. Besides them, tourism
spending is typically high in Asian
countries such as Japan, China,
South Korea and Singapore
(UNTWO, 2005b).
Hungary witnesses similar tenden-
cies to the international ones, both
with respect to the number of
tourists arriving to Hungary and
Hungarians visiting foreign coun-
tries. Hungary, as the 17th most pop-
ular tourist destination, receiving
12.2 million visitors annually, occu-
pies a prominent place in the region-
al international statistics.
On one hand, Hungary increases
spending on the development of the
national image and allocates the
resources effectively. On the other
hand regional initiatives are also
emerging such as the development
of Sármellék Airport. This aims to
make Lake Balaton and its sur-
roundings an interesting, important
and accessible travel destination for
all Europeans rather than remain-
ing primarily a domestic vacation
spot. Considering all this, it can be
concluded that tourism is to be
regarded as a dimension of the econ-
omy that is gaining more and more
ground in Hungary today.
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“Mobility is a good thing, 
but I wouldn’t go to live abroad”
It is rather unanimous that the
establishment of peace and the
Common Market were the most
important achievements of our
immediate environment, the
European Union. Nevertheless, for
53% of EU citizens the EU repre-
sents mostly the disappearance of
state borders and the free movement
of labour (Eurobarometer, 2005). In
the light of the above, it is some-
what surprising that Europeans,
who like to visit other countries as
tourists in great numbers, make use
of the possibilities offered by the
freedom to work within the
European Union rather reluctantly. 
Only 4 per cent of the EU citizens
have worked in another member
state. In the United States, for exam-
ple, despite of the similarly vast geo- 61
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Figure 14 – World’s Top Tourism Destinations (absolute numbers)
S O U R C E :  World Tourism Organisation, 2005
Ranking International tourist Change Market Arrivals per
arrivals (million) (%) share hundred
inhabitants
2002 2003 2004 2002/01 2003/02 2004/03 2004
World 700 690 763 2,9 –1,5 10,7 100 11
1 France 77,0 75,0 75,1 2,4 –2,6 0,1 9,8 124
2 Spain 52,3 51,8 53,6 4,5 –0,9 3,4 7,0 133
3 United States 43,6 41,2 46,1 –7,1 –5,4 11,8 6,0 16
4 China 36,8 33,0 41,8 11,0 –10,4 26,7 5,5 3
5 Italy 39,8 39,6 37,1 0,6 –0,5 –6,4 4,9 64
6 United Kingdom 24,2 24,7 27,8 5,9 2,2 12,3 3,6 46
7 Hong Kong (China) 16,6 15,5 21,8 20,7 –6,2 40,4 2,9 318
8 Mexico 19,7 18,7 20,6 –0,7 –5,1 10,5 2,7 20
9 Germany 18,0 18,4 20,1 0,6 2,4 9,5 2,6 24
10 Austria 18,6 19,1 19,4 2,4 2,5 1,5 2,5 237
11 Canada 20,1 17,5 19,2 1,9 v12,6 9,2 2,5 59
12 Turkey 12,8 13,3 16,8 18,6 4,3 26,1 2,2 24
13 Malaysia 13,3 10,6 15,7 4,0 –20,4 48,5 2,1 67
14 Ukraine 10,5 12,5 15,6 14,6 19,0 24,9 2,0 33
15 Poland 14,0 13,7 14,3 –6,8 –1,9 4,2 1,9 37
16 Greece 14,2 14,0 – 0,9 –1,5 131
17 Hungary – – 12,2 1,6 122
18 Thailand 10,9 10,0 11,7 7,3 –8,0 16,5 1,5 18
19 Portugal 11,6 11,7 11,6 –4,3 0,5 –0,8 1,5 110
20 Netherlands 9,6 9,2 9,6 1,0 –4,3 5,1 1,3 59
21 Russian Federation 7,9 8,5 9,2 7,3 7,3 7,5 1,2 6
22 Saudi Arabia 7,5 7,3 8,6 11,5 –2,4 17,0 1,1 33
32 Macao (China) 6,6 6,3 8,3 12,4 –3,9 21,9 1,1 1869
33 Croatia 6,9 7,4 7,9 6,1 6,7 6,8 1,0 176
25 Ireland 6,5 6,8 7,0 1,9 4,4 3,2 0,9 176
graphical distances, mobility is high-
er, which has a positive effect on eco-
nomic growth. The American example
points out the importance of the lan-
guage (in their case English, spoken
by nearly everybody). In Europe
today, language is an obstacle: only
those can benefit from the possibili-
ties of mobility that speak the lan-
guage(s) necessary for work and are
culturally open-minded. 
As opposed to mobility between mem-
ber states, to date, mobility within the
regions of the given countries has
proved more attractive: every third
person has already lived outside of the
region where they were born. With
the intention to present the advan-
tages of free labour movement, the
European Union declared 2006 the
Year of Workers’ Mobility and the fol-
lowing proves that this was not an
unfounded idea. There is indeed a
serious need for the providing of infor-
mation on the advantages of mobility.
The 2005 Eurobarometer survey,
based on a sample of 24 000 people,
shows that EU citizens, on the
whole, find it advantageous for indi-
viduals to work abroad. However,
they themselves are less willing to
move abroad in the hope of a better
job. It is the opinion of 46% of the
EU citizens that working abroad is a
good thing for individuals, 49%
thinks that it is beneficial for the
labour market, and 59% finds it use-
ful for the European integration.
The propensity for mobility, howev-
er, is much lower. 
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Figure 16 – Proportion of citizens who think geographical mobility is beneficial 
for individuals, by EU countries
S O U R C E : Eurobarometer 2005
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70% of the population of member
states has no intention at all to
work in another region even within
their own country. It clearly shows
that there is only a small chance
that the propensity for mobility
among EU citizens will increase sig-
nificantly in the coming years. 
This is especially unfortunate in
light of the fact that most
Europeans are aware that mobility
can improve their career options as
well as strengthening their chances
for financial growth. Nevertheless, a
better job, a bigger salary, a more
favourable climate and the chance to
meet other cultures melt into the
background due to the fear of break-
ing off personal contacts. EU sur-
veys underpin that it is chiefly the
family relations and friends that
keep people embedded in their envi-
ronment. 
The importance of these factors
cannot be questioned; however, the
spread of the Internet can now
make it easier for many to break
away from their accustomed sphere,
if only for a few years. Thanks to
the new telecommunication tech-
nologies, keeping in close touch
with family and friends from
abroad has become a simple under-
taking. Furthermore, it is easy to
follow political events of the home-
land and familiar cultural products
are readily available without any
difficulties. Despite the geographi-
cal distance, by using the new tech-
nologies those living abroad are not
excluded from the processes at
home as they would have been two
decades ago when moving abroad
meant nearly complete seclusion
from domestic life. In spite of all
the above, the Eurobarometer sur-
veys indicate that for the moment,
no matter how easy keeping in
touch is made by the new communi-
cation technologies (that are becom-
ing cheaper and cheaper and devel-
op at an unbelievable speed) the
loss of personal contacts cannot be
compensated for.
Evidently, it would be a mistake to
generalize: there are significant dif-
ferences between member states.
The Irish, Danish, Swedish and
Slovakians find geographical mobili-
ty explicitly advantageous in con-
trast with the Greeks and Cypriots.
Less than 30% of the latter find it
useful for the individuals to leave
home for work. The threat of unem-
ployment, however, can change atti-
tude towards mobility. More than
half of the Poles would not mind
moving, even to another country,
just to find work (British immigra-
tion officers, having registered sever-
al hundred thousand Poles since the 63
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EU accession, could tell stories about
this outstanding geographical mobili-
ty). If at risk of unemployment, the
Swedish, Latvians and Dutch would
not hesitate either to work abroad.
On the contrary, the Irish,
Austrians, Hungarians and Czech do
not intend to work abroad even if
they lost their job at their actual res-
idence (Eurobarometer, 2005). 
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In addition to the above, geographical
flexibility is impeded by excessive
attachment to the workplace.
Europeans work for 10.6 years on
average at the same workplace (6.7
years in the USA) and less than 10 per
cent of employees change jobs within a
year (Eurobarometer, 2005).
Furthermore, considering that 54 per
cent of Europeans do not intend to
change jobs in the following five years,
it can be stated that the pre-requisite
of greater geographical mobility in the
EU is the social acceptability and 
regularity of the change of workplace.
As mentioned above – in connection
with the Hungarian xenophobia –
propensity for mobility is particular-
ly low in Hungary. With respect 
to mobility to and from the country,
in international comparison,
Hungarians are at the rear, 
being one of the least mobile
nations. This is cause and effect,
simultaneously, in the present 
competitive situation. In the compe-
tition for employment in the 
globalising labour market,
Hungarian citizens are falling
behind.
Figure 16 – Proportion of citizens who are ready to leave their residence if faced 
with unemployment, by EU countries
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S O U R C E :  Eurobarometer 2005
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Figure 17 – Propensity for Mobility (%)
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S O U R C E : György Csepeli: A kihûlt forrasztótégely (The cooled-off melting pot)
Key issue of our time: attracting
human capital
It is commonly known that govern-
ment expenditures on innovative
research and development are high
priorities in the economies of our
age. (in the OECD countries this
increases by a yearly 10 per cent in
average since 2000). Money is not
everything, though: the rate of the
scientific and technological progress
of a country and the volume of its
creative potential is decisively deter-
mined by the quality of its work
force. Therefore, in the final para-
graphs of this chapter, it is impor-
tant to take a quick look at the glob-
al competition for talents, i.e.
human capital. 
The leading position of the United
States in the global competition is
unquestionable. At the beginning of
the 21st century, 41 per cent of high-
ly qualified immigrants arriving at
the OECD countries settled in the
United States. In Europe, immi-
grants with higher education
degrees prefer Great Britain,
Germany and France. The share of
these countries from highly-skilled
immigrants, however, does not even
approach their ratio in the United
States (Basri, 2001). European coun-
tries should draw the conclusions as
soon as possible: they have to offer
more attractive conditions, better
research fellowships and more prom-
ising career options in order to
attract a greater proportion of the
world’s talents. 
The American dominance is likely to
be challenged by the reclusive reac-
tions that have followed the events
of 11th September, 2001. As a com-
parison, the United States has a
smaller share of university students
studying abroad than of employees
with higher education degree work-
ing abroad. In addition, the numer-
ous obstacles that immigrants are
faced with upon arrival in America
will likely prevent talents of the
world from studying there in the
future.
Though there is no lack of elite uni-
versities in the USA, seclusion in
the long run can harm the potential
for innovation, indispensable to a
competitive economy. Great Britain,
on the other hand, has achieved a
successful combination of high stan-
dard universities and open immigra-
tion policy. As a result, in compari-
son to the size of the population it
attracts foreign students more suc-
cessfully than the USA (despite its
five times bigger population, the
share of foreign students in the USA
is only twice of the share of Britain).
66
Figure 18 – Proportion of highly qualified immigrants in OECD, 2001
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S O U R C E : Basri 2001
A frequent and often justifiable con-
cern about the migration of a highly
skilled work force is the brain drain,
the loss of the best and most quali-
fied citizens. However, the tenden-
cies of recent years indicate that
today, instead of “brain drain” it is
more precise to use the term “brain
circulation” to describe the actual
process. The theory of brain drain
expresses that the flight of highly
qualified workforce necessarily
harms the home country. In con-
trast, the theory of brain circulation
says that the circulation of talents is
not a one-way process and is eco-
nomically beneficial both for the
homeland and the host country. 
Undoubtedly, emigration entails the
risk of losing the best; still, the
process itself and its consequences
are more complex (Solimano, 2006).
Emigration is not a one-way process:
also the sending nations benefit
from the movement in numerous
ways. On one hand, immigrants
transfer a portion of their earnings
home, supporting relatives or invest-
ing it and starting small businesses
in the mother country. Furthermore,
beyond the financial dimensions,
countries that are afraid of the final
loss of human capital actually bene-
fit from the improvement of their
human capital. The home country
will be the recipient of benefits as
the knowledge obtained can be
applied in many parts of the world,
or in the case of moving back, made
of particular use at home. 
It must be noted that a significant
amount of foreigners graduating
from North American or Western
European elite universities embark
on their career with the very ambi-
tion to build production and com-
mercial relationship with their “old
country”. Anna Lee Saxenian splen-
didly described the process of brain
circulation through the example of
the Silicon Valley. She points out
that it is the highly qualified entre-
preneurs working abroad and estab-
lishing strong economic and trade
connection points with the mother
country that can provide variation
for the often extremely negative per-
spective on geographical and intel-
lectual mobility (Saxenian 2007).
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Most revolutions start from above.
The Soviet and Russian revolutions
are good examples for elite-led revo-
lutions, where a relatively well qual-
ified elite group decides to change
the existing social order and wins a
mass of people for the cause.
Therefore – regardless of the final
result – most revolutions are not
really democratic, the children of the
“people” play the role of extras and
this role is not always favourable. 
In this respect, globalisation and the
accompanying information revolu-
tion are indeed extraordinary. The
above chapters prove that it is most-
ly individuals leading this revolu-
tion. Evidently, the traditional char-
acters, i.e. the government sphere
and big companies have significant
influence on globalisation. But the
system of horizontal networks that
serve as a basis for the information
revolution provides unprecedented
opportunities for individuals.
YouTube, iwiw, MySpace, eBay or
photo sharing websites like Flickr
are cultural and economic forums
that provide individual participants
with the unparalleled chance to
reach a vast audience. It is at the
same time an interactive process,
where individuals receive, mediate,
and in numerous occasions create
new, common cultural values.
Nearly all instruments promoting
globalisation are available for indi-
viduals, with which they can shape
and make use of globalisation. The
economic aspects of bottom-up initi-
ations are only a part (however
important) of all the above.
Although the legend of the “rags to
riches” American success story has
always existed, there has never been
an age when so many people could
have achieved prosperity from
poverty. Even now, after the dotcom
balloon had (temporarily) popped,
there are many who can acquire
vast fortunes starting with a mini-
mal capital and using their creativi-
ty. The novelty of network society is
that nearly unlimited information
and creative opportunities are creat-
4. SUMMARY 
71
E
ve
ry
da
y 
G
lo
ba
li
sa
ti
on
4
. 
S
um
m
ar
y 
ed with relatively few instruments.
A clever programmer equipped with
a PC has more than once surpassed
giant companies.
This revolution is shaped by those
who participate and take an active
part in it and the special role of indi-
viduals here entails special responsi-
bility. The opportunities of the state
and big companies are limited, while
those of individuals are vast. In
light of this, the traditional respon-
sibility relations prove to be inverse:
it cannot be expected of the state to
find us a place in international net-
works, learn languages for us or
serve to us on a platter the ever
widening cultural supply. The state
continues to play an important role
in providing the necessary condi-
tions to acquire basic skills, but the
responsibility to initiate is increas-
ingly left to the individual and relies
upon their freedom of decision. This
requires openness and a certain
acceptance of the fact that success
entails risk. In this case, that risk is
worth taking. 
As far as open society is concerned,
Hungary is still lagging behind. Our
attitudes towards globalisation and
the world are rather ambivalent.
The opinion of the significant major-
ity ranges from tough rejection to
slight refrain and we are strongly
xenophobic (Dessewffy-Pulai, 2005).
Even in the circle of liberal intellec-
tuals, it is fashionable to the speak
evil of the cultural and commercial
products of globalisation.
Nevertheless, the plazas and multi-
plexes are crowded and the sale of
foreign goods bides rather well in
Hungary. For our travels more and
more often we choose foreign desti-
nations, and moreover, we have
begun to discover touristic regions
that were thus far exotic to us, like
Asia and Africa. But despite the
complaints, the theoretical antipa-
thy (fortunately) does not pass into
practical refusal of the achievements
of globalisation.
Unfortunately, the openness that
manifests on the recipient side does
not go together with open-minded-
ness in the shaping of globalisation
and the exploitation of its opportuni-
ties. Our refraining attitude has
indeed negative effects. The most
evident example here is that
Hungarians hardly seize the oppor-
tunities that lie in studying and at
least temporal working abroad, and
we are not in the least trying to
attract and welcome undiscovered
knowledge. Hungary participates in
“brain circulation” only on the send-
ing side, and here it is only to a lim-
ited extent. Scepticism against the
outer world in general, manifests
itself in the low level of foreign lan-
guage knowledge even though it is
in this that way we allow ourselves
to miss numerous opportunities. 
Sooner or later we will have to face
the reality that some Western coun-
tries are already witnessing: immi-
gration cannot be avoided. It is true
however, as the above chapters
prove, that the proportion of highly
qualified young people leaving
Hungary is rather low. Despite this,
we realise significant loss as a result
of brain drain. With the spread of
foreign language education, and the
widening of foreign opportunities it
is expected that the number of those
who try their luck abroad will rise.
This is, no doubt, inherent in global-
isation. But this process, combined
with the population decrease and its
dramatic effects, can create a signifi-
cant deficit in skilled workforce
already in middle-term, especially as
far as the maintaining of the
increasing pensioner population is
concerned. Obviously, this problem
can be compensated for in many
ways. There exist numerous solu-
tions from the raising of retirement
age to the encouraging of child-birth;
the actual solution will likely be a
mixture of the different policies. It
cannot be avoided, however, that we
attract professionally skilled work-
force in a globalising world, because
as long as the Hungarian public
opinion remains in strict rejection of
that attitude, we deprive ourselves
of many economic, scientific and cul-
tural opportunities. It is in our fun-
damental and common economic,
cultural and social interest to
receive a net share of the global cir-
culation of knowledge and skills.72
We are perfectly aware of the fact
that it is far from being easy and
generally accessible to seize the
opportunities of globalisation. Many
people have no chance to learn lan-
guages, discover the world, study in
foreign knowledge centres or profes-
sionally train themselves. DEMOS
Hungary Foundation has published
two studies on child poverty
(Darvas-Tausz, 2006 and Ágoston-
Gyôri-Kollányi-Tornai, 2006) unam-
biguously revealing that for a signif-
icant part of the population – and
especially for the most vulnerable
group, the poor children –problems
are rooted in everyday subsistence
and the acquisition of basic skills. 
This however does not imply that
globalisation is a secondary problem
that can be separated from poverty.
In the short term it is obvious that
assisting the disadvantaged requires
programmes ensuring basic subsis-
tence and the acquisition of basic
knowledge, independently from any
instruments and opportunities of
globalisation. In the middle and long
term, however, it would be a danger-
ous self-deception to think that
those on the margins of society can
be integrated into the economic,
social and cultural processes without
providing them access to the oppor-
tunities of globalisation. In the
medium term it is not true that the
opportunities of globalisation are the
least of people’s worries. The point
should be made that in the 21st cen-
tury no pro-equity and anti-poverty
policy can exist without focusing on
the adaptation into the global age at
the very same time. As it is high-
lighted in the second chapter, the
digital gap is the most immediate
equity problem of our age. Those
growing up without basic computer
knowledge will suffer bigger disad-
vantages than those fifty years ago –
when there was an abundance of
manual work – who could not read
and write. 
Globalisation is a complex political,
social and economic challenge. It is
political because in democracies it is
the task of the elected government
to realise the challenges the nation
faces and give appropriate policy
answers. It is the responsibility of
politics to help and provide the con-
ditions necessary to adapt to the
global processes exploiting the range
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of instruments of the state. But at
the same time it is a social task
where each individual is equally
responsible. Evidently, a critical
attitude that realises the negative
effects realistically is very useful for
the society. As it was emphasised in
the beginning of the present study,
such a rational consideration and
analytical approach is required
towards globalisation. However,
those who are not willing to recog-
nize anything besides the negative
aspects therefore miss any potential
advantages of the opening opportu-
nities. They also harm personal and
public interest equally or more than
those who relate to any changes
with blind enthusiasm. Those hold-
ing on to the unrealistically negative
picture of globalisation are not revo-
lutionary but retrograde. Those
wanting to keep society away from
globalisation instead of assisting in
taking advantage of it are not the
speaker of equality but of inequity
and falling behind.
With the unity of politics, society
and economy we must prepare
strategically for the challenges of
globalisation. This means that we
shall become able to take part in the
global cooperation that acts effec-
tively as a brake on the negative
effects while fully exploiting its
opportunities. First of all, those poli-
cy solutions are considered here that
experts have been suggesting for a
long time: the importance of widen-
ing the accessibility of digital tech-
nologies in education with special
attention to those parts of the coun-
try where home Internet connection
is rare.
The World Wide Web itself and the
wide spectrum of all that it offers
are worth treating as a school sub-
ject. Instead of worrying what dan-
gerous and harmful sites children
might browse, it is well worth intro-
ducing them to the many interesting
and useful contents that would
potentially draw their attention,
spark their interest and diversify
and improve their skills. The quali-
tative improvement of foreign lan-
guage education is indispensable, as
is more effective encouragement of
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language learning. If we do not
advance in this field it is very likely
that all other efforts will prove to be
in vain. We can learn from countries
where speaking English is as com-
mon as knowing multiplication. The
Netherlands and the Scandinavian
countries do not belong to the most
successful countries of the global
world by chance. It is only one fac-
tor, but a symptomatic one and one
that has a great effect on the level of
foreign language knowledge: in
these countries English broadcasts
are not dubbed but screened with
subtitles thus increasing the
instances of encounter with the
English language. In Hungary, it is
difficult to imagine television in a
foreign language although it would
definitely mean a big step towards
the improvement of language skills. 
The improvement in foreign lan-
guage learning can be enhanced par-
tially by the widening of the scope of
cultural exchange with foreigners
and foreign countries. In essence, we
have to make an effort both in the
education system and in employ-
ment to attract more and more qual-
ified foreigners as well as send our
own citizens abroad in greater num-
bers. Naturally, in the long run our
interest is that our citizens capital-
ize on their experience here in
Hungary, return after a while and
thus bring the world closer to us. In
order to achieve this, it is also oblig-
atory that foreigners working in
Hungary are able to integrate more
easily, that they do not have the
impression of meeting walls with
their different, but in certain cases
novel, and more effective approach.
The intention of reversing the direc-
tion of brain drain has to appear
among government objectives. 
First and foremost, as the basis of
all the above, we have to endeavour
to slowly but surely change the
Hungarian mentality in connection
with globalisation. Public policies
can be successful only if they are
accompanied by a shift in attitude
towards globalisation. The world is
changing and it depends on us how
we profit from it. After two totalitar-
ian dictatorships, the critical bias is
absolutely reasonable, keeping our
distance from big processes that
transform society is justifiable in a
region where big changes have
resulted in little good so far. Besides
the critical position, however, the
healthy approach seems to be an
open-minded, ambitious attitude. We
have to try and direct the advan-
tages of the present complex process
for our own benefit. But if our
approach to globalisation is nothing
else but determined resistance, no
public policies and no government
will ever be able to change it.
Opportunities start at individuals. 
We cannot cross out limits; we can-
not create a new society from one
day to the next. This does not only
hold for the limited possibilities of
individuals but those of the state as
well. As homo sovieticus was not
successfully cultivated, not even
with the entire range of instruments
of the totalitarian state, similarly,
the liberal-democratic nation state
will not be able to create the homo
globalicus at a stroke. This dramatic
approach is unnecessary, But never-
theless, both as individuals and by
means of politics we can indeed act
so that many of us enjoy the fruits of
the globalising world. We can partic-
ipate and make sure that that the
achievements of globalisation are
not left as exploitation, climate
change, unilateralism of super pow-
ers and terrorism, but materialize as
the spreading of prosperity, cultural
and scientific dialogues, environ-
ment-conscious lifestyle, equity and
cooperation for a secure world.
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